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ABSTRACT
FACILITATION OF MEMORY FOR EVENTS AT AGE 2:
PHYSICAL AND CONVERSATIONAL REMINDERS OF ACTIONS AND
OUTCOMES
SEPTEMBER 1995
CINDY J. SPEAKER, A. A., SIMON'S ROCK COLLEGE OF BARD
B.A., SIMON'S ROCK COLLEGE OF BARD
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Emeritus Nancy A. Myers
Four groups of 2-year-old children participated in a
complex play event complete with a goal, a series of trials
locating hidden objects, and an unexpected outcome. A same-
day test/event repetition indicated good memory for the event,
and no group differences in performance. After 2 mos,
children returned to the University for a memory assessment.
The groups were defined by the reminder treatments they
received 30 min before test, which included structured
reminiscence or presentation of physical stimuli. The
Reminiscence group was asked specific questions about event
components. The Action group was presented a reminder of the
central action required to locate objects. The Outcome group
saw a reminder of the event outcome. A control group received
no reminder; children were presented with a neutral stimulus
unrelated to the event. No group demonstrated memory at a
maximum level, and group differences were not apparent for all
indices. However, reminder groups performed differently on
vi
some behavioral and verbal measures from the No Reminder
group, each other, and a group with similar experience tested
after 4 mos (Speaker & Myers, 1995, March). Children given
the Outcome and Reminiscence treatments provided the event
goal and outcome and named objects more than comparison
groups, and their overall memory scores were significantly
higher than those of the No Reminder group. Children in the
Outcome group also located more objects than the earlier
group. In addition, more children in the Reminiscence group
provided event information at the 2-mo test than had done so
at the immediate test. Children presented the Action
reminder, however, fared no better than those presented the No
Reminder stimulus. Neither did they perform better than
children from the earlier study. Hence, they were performing
after a 2-mo interval in a manner equivalent to that of
children tested after 4 months. Results are discussed in
terms of how children benefit from reminders, why certain
reminders are more facilitative than others, and what they
inform us about underlying memory processes and mechanisms.
The relevance of the results to theories of early memory is
also considered.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The overall goal of the research program in which the
current study is embedded is the understanding of early long-
term memory: how it may be expressed; what affects its
expression; and the processes underlying expression. Previous
work, to be reviewed below, has established that children can
express memory for infancy events — days, weeks, months and
even years later — in a number of ways, and in response to a
variety of cues. Their memory is far from complete, however,
and the immediate focus of the current study is on potential
means of facilitating memory expression in very young
children. Of particular interest is whether reminders can
enhance performance of 2-year olds on a number of verbal and
behavioral memory measures, and whether certain types of
reminders are more effective than others.
Theories of Early Memory and Infantile Amnesia
The phenomenon of adults being unable to recall early
autobiographic events has been termed infantile or childhood
amnesia. Pillemer and White (1989) found that theories of
infantile amnesia fall into one of three explanatory
categories — repression, cognitive limitations, or social
circumstances
.
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Repression Explanations
The belief that infantile amnesia is due to repression is
attributed to Freud's psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1938).
Pillemer and White discuss two views put forth by Freud. One,
the blockade model, considers childhood memories to be present
and fully formed; however, they are behind a wall of
repression, so to speak, and as adults we are unable to access
them. According to Freud, this repression is the result of
the conflicts involved with infantile sexuality. Freud's less
extreme view that he advocated later in his career is a
selective reconstruction model. This model proposes that
children do not form fully detailed memories. Rather, due to
repressive mechanisms, the memories have missing parts and
only fragments exist. Reconstruction of these memories is
extremely difficult and often leads to misleading memories.
Both of these Freudian models view early memories as
irretrievable by the adult.
Cognitive Explanations
A second position on the cause of infantile amnesia is
that it is due to the cognitive inabilities of children. That
is, the child is cognitively unable to process information in
such a way that facilitates long-term retention. It is seen
as an encoding deficit on the part of the child more than a
retrieval deficit on the part of the adult or older child.
2
the
For Piaget, who is most widely associated with
exploration of the cognitive development of children, memories
require cognitive capabilities such as judgments and logical
relations, as memory is very much a (re) constructive process.
According to his theory of cognitive development these
abilities are not possible until the concrete operational
period. Thus, it is not so surprising that we do not remember
events occurring before the age of 3. Before this stage, the
child is in a stage dominated by sensory influences. Although
in the intuitive stage of the preoperational period (ages 4-
7) , memories for isolated events are possible, it is only
during the concrete operational stage (ages 7-12) that the
necessary connections are made to have an understanding of
chronology, and meaning then can be attributed to events.
According to Piaget, the development of memory can be traced
in accordance with the development of structures which allow
better organization of past and present experiences (Piaget
and Inhelder, 1973) . The increasing capability of the child
in using processes such as accommodation and assimilation
allow for better memory. This mnemonic process development
may be considered continuous in the sense that the emergence
of recognition, reconstruction, and recall abilities occur in
an ordered sequence. The development of memory is also tied
to the development of intelligence by means of the mnemonic
devices that are employed. It appears then that for Piaget,
memory is immensely connected to representational capabili-
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ties, especially language, which he believes emerge at the end
of the sensorimotor period.
Mandler (1988, 1992), on the other hand, proposes that
there exists an accessible conceptual system which develops
simultaneously with the sensorimotor system, allowing infants
to encode by a process of perceptual analysis. She defines
this process as the conscious active comparison of one
perception to another, or as paying close attention and
examining one or more stimuli. This process results in
redescriptions of spatial structure into the form of image-
schemas which include relational features. It is these
redescriptions that Mandler claims constitute the accessible
meanings that infants use to create concepts.
This mechanism differs from that of Piaget's sensorimotor
functioning in several ways. First, Mandler asserts that
infants are born with the capacity to engage in perceptual
analysis. Mandler admits that it is a primitive system at
first; one that develops just as the sensorimotor system
develops. In contrast, Piaget's theory does not allow for
perceptual comparisons before the age of two years.
Second, Piaget suggests that only after sensorimotor
development permits the emergence of representative skill and
subsequent language, does the child engage in thinking.
Mandler, however, does not require the infant to have
linguistic skills in order to be capable of representational
thought. She believes that infants have representations but
4
are not able to verbally communicate them. Related to
language is the issue of symbolic functioning. This
capability, for Piaget, emerges at the same time as language
which then leads to the emergence of recall and imitation.
For Mandler
,
this system is the "vehicle of thought" and is
present much earlier than two years of age. Recall by
Mandler' s definition is a conscious product of bringing into
awareness information regarding a specific item or event
(Mandler, 1990b). She sees two requirements for recall.
First, information must be encoded in a conceptual format.
Second, information must have been consciously attended to or
noticed.
There is some evidence that suggests that changes in
cognitive capabilities are related to neurophysiological
changes including changes in the brain itself and hormonal
changes (Pillemer & White, 1989) . Howe and Courage (1993) in
a recent review of this literature concluded as well that the
memory system of infants operates more completely than once
believed, as the basic hardware is in place at birth for
perception, learning, and memory. The system continues to
mature during the first two postnatal years and is constrained
by neurophysiological changes. In particular, three changes
have been implicated. First, there is immaturity of the
hippocampal region of the infant's forebrain. Researchers
have connected the hippocampal region with the distinction
between procedural and declarative memory . Although
5
procedural memory can operate with an immature or damaged
hippocampal region, declarative memory cannot. Second, there
is immaturity of the infant's prefrontal cortex. The
development of this region between 8 and 24 months of age has
been found to facilitate ability for cognitive tasks. Third,
the rate of synaptic efficiency has been found to improve
during infancy and may well underlie memory and learning
changes
.
Another important set of cognitive explanations are
focused on resource limitation and/or the existence of
deficiencies in storage capacities and processing capabilities
of children. Pascual -Leone ' s model of cognition, as cited by
White and Pillemer (1979), contains a set of metaconstructs
with operators that activate mental schemes. M-space is the
central computing space, which determines how much can be
activated simultaneously using voluntary attention. The size
of M-space increases with age. For the first two years of
life, the child is equipped only with an amount denoted as "e"
that is the space occupied by the executive schemes that
direct the operators. The space is then built up one scheme
or unit every two years. Consequently, working memory is a
limited resource, as once the space is utilized no further
processing can be completed. Case, Kurland, and Goldberg
(1982) on the other hand see M-space as a fixed amount of
total processing space set from birth. The capabilities of
this total operating space is affected by how much space the
6
operations take up. Thus, space can become available once
proficiency is attained. Consequently, strategies can
increase operational efficiency which would then lead to
greater M-space availability.
Social Explanations
The last set of explanations for infantile amnesia as set
forth by Pillemer and White relate to socially induced
changes. Positions included here range from those emphasizing
that the categories of adult memory do not allow childhood
memories to be categorized (Schachtel's view) to those
suggesting that the unlikelihood of reinstating the total
context makes retrieval of early memories difficult (Rovee-
Collier's view) . According to Schachtel (1947)
,
it is not
that experiences during the early years of life are not in
memory but that the adult "mode" of experience is so radically
different that it causes retrieval incapability. Although
Rovee-Collier and Hayne (1987) were not discussing social
context, much of their message about physical context effects
may be applicable here. They have suggested one hypothesis
accounting for the contents of memory over time. They assume
that memories are hierarchically organized such that specific
details of proximal cues, defined as those closely associated
with the contingency, are forgotten first before general
features and distal cues, defined as those that can be
considered part of the setting or context. If the proximal
7
cues have been forgotten and the testing context does not
match the represented context in some manner, retrieval will
not occur.
and White propose a dual memory system to
explain the existence of infantile amnesia. They suggest two
components; a primitive system that is present at birth and
operational throughout one's life, and a social system that
emerges during the preschool years. The primitive system
responds to situational and affective cues. Memories are
expressed through "images, behaviors, or emotions" (1989, p.
326)
.
In the social system, memories can be intentionally
retrieved and verbalized to others, thereby mediating the
emergence of the capability of autobiographical memory. The
key difference between the two is language. Pillemer and
White seem to place greater importance on the second system.
Is this really appropriate? Is the ability to communicate
one's memory the ultimate determination of its value or its
existence?
Nelson (1993) also views the absence of language and a
social component as reasons for infantile amnesia. She
distinguishes between three types of memories. These are: (1)
generic event memory which is more or less a general outline,
containing no details; (2) episodic memory which refers to
something that happened once at a specific time and place; and
(3) autobiographical memory which is a subset of episodic
memory referring to specific, personal events that are long-
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lasting and of significance to the self system. Her view is
that infantile amnesia arises not because something is lost
but rather because the ability to have autobiographical
memories develops. Children develop this ability by social
interactions in which they learn the forms of how to talk
about memories with others, and thus learn how to actually
formulate their memories as narratives, which Nelson considers
retrievable forms. Nelson's view is similar to Pillemer and
White's position that the social system of their dual memory
system exists so that memories can be intentionally retrieved
and verbalized to others. Language provides the means for
sharing and retaining memories. She believes that the
function of autobiographical memory is to share memories with
other people. Her theoretical claim is that
...autobiographical memory in childhood is social in
origin and depends to a large degree upon the verbalized
accounts of others, in particular the adults with whom
the child shares social-cultural bonds, most obviously
the parents. How experiences are formulated in the
child's accessible autobiographical memory system is then
strongly dependent on how they are formulated by adults
who share the experience. (Tessler & Nelson, 1994, p.
322)
Self-Knowledge Explanations
Howe and Courage (1993) in a recent review article on
infantile amnesia advocate a different approach to
understanding the phenomenon. They describe the term amnesia
as "somewhat of a misnomer" (p. 306) in that it is not the
fundamental processes involved in memory that are the source
of later failures to recall early childhood events. They view
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the offset of infantile amnesia not as a function of changes
in memory mechanisms per se nor to limits in cognitive
developments such as operating capacity or language as offered
above. Rather, according to Howe and Courage, the key to
understanding infantile amnesia is the developing sense of
self, not the development of language or a secondary memory
system. That is, "infantile amnesia devolves as knowledge of
the self evolves" (Howe and Courage, 1993, p. 306). A sense
of self is necessary in order to structure autobiographical
memory, defined by Howe and Courage as the memory for
information and events pertaining to self. Consequently, they
argue that events occurring before the development of an
independent sense of self, which occurs about 18 months of
age, cannot be organized as autobiographical memory but rather
are organized as generalized learning experiences. This
occurs because there is no referent around which personally
experienced events can be organized.
One strength of this position is that it can account for
the individual differences which exist in reports of the
offset of infantile amnesia. It is well documented that there
are individual differences in the development of self
concepts, including self-recognition, which is one facet of
self concept. Therefore, one would expect differences in the
timing of the "earliest" memories of individuals since it is
contingent upon the development of a sense of self.
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In considering this position, Leichtman and Ceci (1992)
reason that events that do not fit Howe and Courage's
definition of autobiographical, such as conditioning studies
that depend only on the temporal contiguity between a stimulus
and the child's physical response, will be remembered better
than events that are tied to personally meaningful
experiences. This is because the latter reguire an awareness
of one's own self as the recipient of the experience located
in space and time. Leichtman and Ceci define infantile
amnesia as the inability at any age to retrieve memories of
events that occurred during the first few years of life. They
provide an interesting interpretation using fuzzy-trace
theory.
Fuzzv-Trace Theory
Fuzzy-trace theory, developed by Brainerd and Reyna
(1990)
,
is a gist-driven theory of cognitive development set
forth as an alternative to Piagetian and information-
processing perspectives. There are seven general principles
regarding encoding, storage, and retrieval included in fuzzy-
trace theory, each of which will be briefly described. First,
there is gist extraction. The premise is that during
encoding, information is reduced to its essence. Second,
fuzzy-to-verbatim continua exist which are, on the one end,
defined by fuzzy (gist-like) traces and on the other by
verbatim (veridical) traces. The continua permit encoding of
11
verbatim and fuzzy traces at the same time, and also permit
them to function independently. This allows for maximization
of performance as the multiple traces varying in degrees of
specificity and consequently in ease of retrieval provide
cognitive flexibility. Third, there is a preference for fuzzy
processing. This preference arises from the disadvantages of
verbatim traces. Verbatim traces disintegrate faster, have a
narrow range of effective retrieval cues, and are less
manipulable than fuzzy traces; all of which affect their
availability and accessibility. Fourth, short-term as well as
long-term memory is reconstructive in nature. Unlike other
theories, fuzzy-trace theory does not hold short-term memory
to be a verbatim system only. Rather, like long-term memory,
short-term memory contains both fuzzy and verbatim traces and
which ones are relied upon depends on the particular task
considerations. Fifth, there is output interference. That
is, retrieval itself produces interference for later retrieval
by increasing the amount of irrelevant information. Sixth,
unlike other theories which posit a common processing
resource, fuzzy-trace theory does not include a generic
capacity variable. Thus, there is resource freedom. And
finally, there is an overall ontogenetic assumption. The
first five principles described above have a fundamental
developmental nature. During development, there are varying
abilities to extract and encode gist as well as different
preferences and susceptibilities.
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Overall, fuzzy-trace theory grants that memory holds
multiple traces of events varying as to their verbatim or gist
nature. In some respects, this notion is quite compatible
with the multiple encoding system set forth by Johnson (1983)
.
Her model, which she calls MEM (multiple-entry, modular memory
system)
,
proposes that there are three subsystems (sensory,
perceptual, and reflection) which respond to different aspects
of an experience and thus for any one experience there are
likely to be multiple entries.
In Leichtman and Ceci's discussion of infantile amnesia
via fuzzy-trace theory, only the first three of the seven
principles (gist extraction, fuzzy-to-verbatim continua, and
fuzzy-processing preference) are emphasized. They argue that
gist-like representations have been found to be used
infrequently by younger children. The ability to encode in a
fuzzy or gist-like manner improves with age and frequency of
gist increases. It may be that infants are more on the
verbatim end of the continua due to their lack of language
skills which prevent them from transferring essentially motor
or perceptual representations into more abstract (gist-like)
propositions during the encoding stage. However, Leichtman
and Ceci argue that infants are not incapable of gist-like or
fuzzy representations. They suggest further that the greater
the clarity with which incoming information is perceived by
the infant, the greater the probability that any gist-like
representation of the information will be formed.
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Since verbatim traces decay faster than fuzzy traces and
have a narrower range of retrieval cues, one would expect that
if infants' memories are composed mostly of verbatim traces
that it would be difficult to recall events which occurred
during this time period later on in life. This would
especially be the case under the free recall demands that so
many studies exploring early memories employ, since events
occurring later in childhood have a greater probability of
having been encoded in a gist-like manner, and thus have
decayed at a slower rate and are accessible by a greater
number of cues.
Rather than dismiss Pillemer and White's advocation of a
dual memory system as Howe and Courage do, Leichtman and Ceci
offer that Pillemer and White's second system, which is the
social system, can be interpreted in terms of where particular
memories fall on the fuzzy to verbatim continua. In
particular, if
...the content of this sort of early fuzzy trace does
not lend itself to socially induced retrieval, such
early memories will manifest themselves only in
nonverbal forms. And, as infantile amnesia would
suggest, those traces that are only encoded in an
inadequate verbatim manner by the infant's memory
system will be lost. (Leichtman and Ceci, 1992,
p. 208)
They believe the shift in cognitive capabilities related to
increased linguistic capabilities produces greater gist-like
representations of events allowing for later recall of these
events
.
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Recent data collected by researchers interested in memory
development has shed some light on the infantile amnesia
controversy. Such data (presented below) allow us to begin to
address whether this phenomenon is due to the actual lack or
nature of early memories, or if the problem lies in attempts
to bring forth early memories primarily by focusing on the
verbal component of autobiographical memory.
Loner-Term Memory for Early Events
A number of paradigms have been used to explore the
development of early memory. Not surprisingly, these
different approaches do not always agree on the types of
memory displayed by infants and young children. There is
general agreement, however, that the memory system(s) is (are)
functioning quite well very early on in life.
Visual Recognition
Studies exploring visual recognition memory have shown
that very young infants, just weeks old, are able to recognize
something they have seen before (Cohen & Gelber, 1975) . These
paradigms rely on the infant's looking behavior as their
primary measure as they systematically vary the similarity
between novel and familiar stimuli, either presented
simultaneously as in the paired comparison paradigm, or
sequentially as in the habituation procedure. Infants in
these studies have been shown to recognize a pattern up to 2
15
weeks later. Concerns regarding the interpretation of
infants' looking has led some researchers to conclude that the
visual recognition paradigm is ineffective in illustrating the
memorial capabilities of infants. Rovee-Collier and Hayne
(1987) in particular have expressed dissatisfaction with this
measure and question whether it actually has implications for
the development of infant memory. Specifically, they claim
that the visual recognition paradigm is not a test of long-
term retention but rather that of novelty detection. Their
primary problem with the paradigm is the theoretical construct
upon which it is built, namely, that a stimulus which is
better remembered will be less attended to in the future.
They argue that the inference of retention of one visual event
from the fact that the infant is looking at another (novel
one) is untenable from the standpoint of the function of
memory. Meltzoff (1990) also views the visual paradigm as not
reflecting memory or recall. He argues it speaks only to
habituation, attentional changes, and preference for novelty.
Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement
Rovee-Collier and her colleagues use a learning paradigm
called mobile conjugate reinforcement to examine the
development of memory skills (for reviews see Rovee-Collier,
1993; Rovee-Collier & Hayne, 1987; Rovee-Collier & Shyi,
1992) . This paradigm uses an operant conditioning procedure
in which infants learn to manipulate a mobile by footkicks
16
over two days of training. This procedure is effective only
for infants over 4-6 weeks; most of their studies have used
subjects 2-6 months in age. Retention is assessed in this
procedure during non-reinforcement phases. By so doing, they
claim that performance measured at test does not reflect
savings, but rather a pure memory component that the infant
has brought into the session from what was learned earlier.
Through this procedure they have examined influential factors
affecting duration and specificity of long-term retention,
such as age, time course of memory retrieval, amount of
training, and the training and testing context. Although they
find developmental differences in memory processing, they
consider them to be quantitative in nature and not
qualitative. Infants of all ages have memories that are
forgotten gradually, are recovered by reminders, can be
modified by postevent information and are context sensitive.
Older infants just remember longer and retrieve faster; the
changes are temporal in nature rather than changes in the
underlying mechanism. Rovee-Collier ' s results reveal that
infants forget quite easily, and that the rate of forgetting
is age related. Corresponding data from Brainerd, Reyna,
Howe, and Kingma (1990) show that forgetting rates decrease
with age.
One criticism of the mobile conjugate paradigm is that it
does not necessarily show a well-developed memory system, but
rather just shows that a conditioned motor response which took
17
days to be taught can be maintained over time. And if this is
so, retention of the contingency is evidence only for a habit
or procedural memory system and not one that is capable of
recall. Meltzoff's (1988a, 1988b, 1990) solution to this
problem is a procedure in which infants watch an experimenter
demonstrate certain simple actions but are not allowed to
perform them at that time. The time of test is the first time
infants are allowed to perform the behaviors. Thus, if they
reenact the behavior, one can say that they are recalling a
memory for observed actions and not just running off a motor
program for their own actions.
Imitation
Meltzoff (1988b), employing this deferred imitation
paradigm, has found that infants as young as 9 months can
imitate simple actions with novel objects, and are able to do
so either at an immediate test or at a 24-hour deferred test.
In fact, performance of the delayed test group was not reduced
from that of the immediate test group. Few infants perform
all the imitated acts; however, they do outperform control
subjects. Fourteen-month olds in a similar procedure were
found to recall acts after a delay of 1 week (Meltzoff,
1988a)
,
even with a very novel activity that had zero
probability of occurrence during baseline. And as Hanna and
Meltzoff (1993) have found, the demonstration of the activity
does not necessarily require an adult model. Fourteen- to
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eighteen-month olds demonstrated deferred imitation of peers
two days after initial demonstration, even across context
changes (lab vs. home; day care vs. home). This is the first
evidence for infant imitation from memory across a change in
context.
Mandler defines recall as a conscious product (1990a)
.
For something to be recalled, the information has to be
encoded in a conceptual format, that is encoded declaratively
,
and it has to have been consciously attended to or noticed.
She believes, therefore, that you can only use as a test task
one that cannot be performed on the basis of implicit,
sensorimotor learning alone. She, like Meltzoff, advocates an
imitation paradigm. She uses an imitation task which includes
2 and 3 action sequences of either familiar or novel
activities which are either arbitrarily or causally ordered.
Sixteen to 20- month olds were able, after a single
observation, to reproduce activities both familiar and novel
at an immediate test and a delayed test of 2 weeks. Younger
infants, 11-13 months, showed immediate ordered recall for
both familiar and new events. By 20 months, ordered recall
was seen even after delays of 6 weeks. Considering the more
difficult tasks employed by Mandler, it is not surprising that
only infants older than Meltzoff' s subjects are capable of
performing the task. Mandler insists that the ordered recall
task more clearly measures true recall since the information
to be remembered is not perceptually present. Although she
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argues that to show recall the dependent measure cannot be a
response conditioned through multi-trial learning, she allows
her subjects to immediately imitate the actions they see.
Consequently, they do have at least limited experience
performing the actions when they are tested at the delayed
test. Thus, despite her theoretical position, her
manipulation is not as clean as Meltzoff's, and in addition,
we are left to wonder how one operationally defines level of
consciousness in encoding.
Bauer uses this elicited imitation paradigm as well. She
and her colleagues (Bauer & Hertsgaard, 1993) have found that
with 13.5-and 16.5-month olds, immediate and 1-week delayed
imitation of 2-step sequences is facilitated if the first
action enables the next, rather than being arbitrarily
ordered. Additionally, the older groups were also helped by
the amount of familiarity they had with a given activity.
Looking at more complicated actions (8 steps) and performance
over multiple sessions, Bauer (Bauer & Fivush, 1992) has found
that 30-month olds were able to remember substantial portions
of the events after only a single experience; recall was
better for portions of the events containing enabling
relations; incorporating novel elements into events occurred
spontaneously when they did not break an enabling relation. It
should be noted, however, that the recall performance of these
children was never at ceiling. Overall, Bauer's position is
that from infancy through adulthood, after one or multiple
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experiences, enabling relations aid the organization of event
representations
.
Verba l Recall and Recognition
Fivush and her colleagues have explored event
representations of sequences in slightly older children
(Fivush, Kuebli, & Clubb, 1992) . They used both verbal and
behavioral recall measures to examine 3-5-year olds' event
representation of three kinds of sequences (logical— invariant,
logical-variable, and arbitrary-invariant)
. The behavioral
measures involved reenactment of the original tasks. They
found that memory was affected by both the specifics of the
event organization and the type of recall task. Logical
events were recalled in a better organized manner than
arbitrary events in both verbal and behavioral recall. Also,
subjects recalled more logical events under verbal recall and
more invariant events under behavioral recall.
The work described thus far has focused primarily on
behavioral evidence for early memory. However, when people
talk about early memory, they are often interested in what
children can verbally recall. Several studies by Nelson,
Hudson, and Fivush, working together or with other colleagues,
have often used naturally occurring events, and looked at
amount and type of recall provided by young children. Looking
at memory for a visit to an archeology museum (Fivush, Hudson
& Nelson, 1984)
,
they found that 5-1/2 year old children were
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able after a 6-week delay, to provide recall as good as that
immediately after the event, with virtually no intrusions.
Younger children (3-4 years) have also been found to be able
to provide accurate recall for a trip to Disney World 6 to 18
months after their experience (Hamond & Fivush, 1991 ) . in
this study, there were no effects of age or retention interval
on the amount of recall. All children recounted a lot of
accurate information, although older children were more
detailed than younger children and tended to recall more
information spontaneously. Even younger children than these
have been found to be able to talk about their past (Fivush,
Gray & Fromhoff, 1987) . Fivush et al. asked parents to report
personal events involving the child, and found that 2-year
olds were able to recall as much information about events in
the distant past (more than 3 months preceding) as in the
recent past (within 3 months)
,
and they did not need any more
questions to do so. Additionally, neither the amount nor the
organization of recall was related to the age of the memory.
From these studies then, it can be seen that even young
children are able to talk about their memories. One problem
with these studies, however, is that there is often no record
of the original experience, as they are not controlled events;
who knows how accurate a parent's recollection may be or that
she or he would be aware of all aspects of the event.
Additionally, as control subjects often are not included, it
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is difficult to know if children are displaying recall or
general knowledge about certain events.
The desire to examine recall for a naturally occurring
event in which an accurate record of the experience is
maintained has led researchers to explore memory for medical
procedures. In a recent study by Gordon, Ornstein, Nida,
Follmer
,
Crenshaw, and Albert (1993)
,
3- to 7-year olds were
asked to recall details of an exam either immediately
following the checkup and at a delay of 1, 3 or 6 weeks or
only after a delay of 3 weeks. Retention of the event was
found to be extensive and accurate. Younger children were
found to forget more over the delay and provide less
spontaneous recall but were still able to provide accurate
recall. The researchers concluded that the picture is one of
basic competence at an early age. Age-related changes in
performance were related to a decreased dependency on cues.
Similar conclusions have been drawn by other researchers
as well. Jones, Swift, and Johnson (1988) carried out
activities with 3- and 4-1/2-year old children in an unique
setting. Testing sessions occurred, not in the same context,
either the same day, 1 week later, or 8 weeks later. Open-
ended recall questions were asked and then more specific
questions followed regarding activities and objects.
Recognition tasks were also administered. Their results
demonstrated that 3- and 4-1/2-year-olds performed similarly
not only in the recognition task, but also in recall of the
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was
activities performed. Object recall for 3-year-olds
poorer than that of the 4-1/2-year-olds. Activities were well
retained, while objects were more susceptible to forgetting.
Consequently, Jones et al. concluded that it is the type of
memory solicited that demonstrates any difference between
these two age groups, rather than a generalized age-related
competency differentiating them.
Assessing Long-Term Memory with Multiple Measures
In our own lab, studies were conducted which examined
memory for a controlled event occurring in the first year of
life. Myers, Clifton, and Clarkson (1987) assessed the
memories of 2-year olds for a series of laboratory events
which occurred during their first year of life. Subjects had
participated in an auditory localization study when they were
6-40 weeks of age in which they experienced 15-19 sessions
during this time period. Sessions involved reaching for
sounding objects in both the light and dark. Needless to say,
this was a very unique experience and contained many elements
that would not be encountered outside of the laboratory
environment. It was also an event that was repeated many
times. For the subsequent memory study, subjects returned to
the laboratory when they were almost three years old. The
room itself, the apparatus, the experimenter, and the
procedure (except for the addition of a few memory probes)
were exactly the same during the follow-up session as they had
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been during the original sessions. An age-matched control
group who did not have the earlier experiences also was
tested.
Of particular interest here was not only if the subjects
would remember
,
but how they would express their memory.
Specifically, would these now verbal children express memory
of an event which occurred while they were nonverbal in words?
Results indicated that the children did remember their earlier
experiences. However, with the exception of one child,
subjects did not verbally recall the experience. Rather,
their memory was expressed in their behavior — they were more
interactive with the stimuli and they were more likely to
reach and grasp the sounding objects in the dark. Even though
these verbal children did not express their memory verbally,
their verbal capabilities did not impede their memory from
being expressed in their behavior. The memory did not become
inaccessible. Myers et al. concluded that "under conditions
of virtually complete contextual reinstatement of the
environment and procedures of very early event experiences,
but still after a 2-year period which represented two-thirds
of their life span, children under 3 years of age retained
memory for early action sequences" (1987, p. 132).
One of the questions that comes to mind when considering
the Myers et al. results is whether similar results would be
found if the event had not been repeated numerous times.
Perris, Myers, and Clifton (1990) considered this question of
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the effect of repeated experiences. Using a procedure similar
to that of the preceding experiment, children who were in the
laboratory when they were 6.5 months of age to participate in
a sound localization task in the light and dark were brought
back one or two years later at 1.5 or 2.5 years of age,
respectively. Thus, instead of having 15-19 exposures to the
task, they had one. The procedure was the same as the early
experience except for the addition of a few memory
probes, and that for the second half of the trials, subjects
were instructed to find the sounding object. Half of the
older group also received a reactivation treatment in which a
3
-second reminder of the original experimental context was
given one-half hour prior to testing. Experienced children
performed differently than controls, especially on
uninstructed trials. Consequently, Perris et al. concluded
that the children were able to remember a single event that
occurred during the first year of life. Thus, one can
conclude that it was not the numerous exposures in the Myers
et al. study that prompted behavioral expression of memory.
However, it must be remembered that this follow-up also
occurred within the original context. Given this, Perris et
al. found it interesting to note that physical, neurological,
and cognitive changes did not impede memory.
A series of three studies was carried out to evaluate
long-term memory for an event in the first year of life with
contextual changes over time (Myers, Perris, & Speaker, 1994)
.
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Ten-month old infants were taught to operate a specially
designed toy over a series of four visits and tested at 14
months. Some children were tested 18 months later at 32
months of age and all available were observed at 60 months of
age. Control groups of naive children were tested at each
assessment as well. Experienced children demonstrated that
they possessed memories of the earlier experience (s)
.
Although memory was neither complete nor expressed in the same
manner by all children, experienced children performed
differently than inexperienced peers on a number of behavioral
and verbal measures. One problem that was seen in this series
was the nature of the task at hand. The original toy was
designed to be of interest to and easy to operate for infants,
not older children. It was also designed to bring forth
behavioral recall, not verbal. Indexing event memory at
different ages and stages is a difficult task. Not only is it
a challenge to develop a task appropriate for the age of the
children at the initial experience, but it is also a challenge
to provide appropriate opportunities for demonstration of
memory under changed conditions of age and skill level, as
well as context.
As can be seen by this brief review of the research,
memories for early events can be expressed in many different
ways and not always in the same manner over time. Spear
(1984) advocated that since memory can be expressed in a
number of different ways, it must be measured by a variety of
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behaviors. For example, if one of the two measures had not
been employed in the Fivush, Kuebli, and Clubb (1992) study
discussed above, the researchers would have arrived at a
different position regarding the memorial abilities of their
subjects. An additional example, can be seen in Myers et al.
(1994) . If we had attempted to determine the extent of
children's memories using only one or two measures such as
verbal recall or number of successful responses, we would have
reached the incorrect conclusion that children at 5 years of
age do not have any memory of events experienced 2 to 4 years
previously. The use of multiple behaviors and a cumulative
index in this study provided a more accurate, although not
necessarily complete, memory assessment. Researchers need to
be aware of this possible variety of expression or they will
unknowingly dismiss true exhibition of memory and never really
appreciate nor understand the workings of early memory.
We have seen that young children are capable of
remembering, but there are still no definitive answers to such
questions as at what age memory is possible, how long early
memories last, and what factors influence these memories at
different points in time. Answers to such questions often
depend on the paradigm employed. However, there is general
agreement that knowledge about and experience with events
influence memory. This influence will now be considered; in
particular, I will focus on the role of scripts in recall.
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Scripts and Their Relation to Memory
Following the theory of Schank and Abelson, Nelson (1986)
considers a script "an ordered sequence of actions appropriate
to a particular spatial-temporal context and organized around
a goal" (p. 13). The script specifies places for people,
actions, and things that are filled by the default values if
not presented in the context. Scripts are learned as a
function of experience. Overall, scripts provide a predictive
role, providing a set of expectations. They are theories
about what happens in certain events and they allow for
organization of knowledge and memory. Scripts can exist
within scripts and may contain different possible paths for
pursuit.
Mandler (1988) states that memory for a situation relies
on what is noticed at the time and how what is noticed is
conceptualized. According to script theorists such as Farrar
and Goodman (1990), children interpret new situations by what
they already know. This view can possibly explain some
aspects of infantile amnesia. It may be difficult to pinpoint
early memories because at the time of the event or later,
children are not exactly aware of the exact occasion within
the calendar year, and that context is not always encoded as
part of the memory.
Findings by Winograd and Killinger (1983) regarding
flashbulb memories indicate that older children and adults not
only are capable of understanding the importance of an event,
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but also know their lives conform to a regular pattern of
activities, thereby allowing them to form richer
representations of events which disrupt the daily norm. This
richer representation during encoding allows for greater
recall later. Consequently, having scripts provides the
ability to focus on more of the unusual aspects of the event,
thereby actually encoding more and perhaps encoding better.
Sheingold and Tenney (1982) conducted an interesting study on
the memories of young children for the birth of a younger
sibling. Although there are some potentially serious
methodological problems with their questions, they found that
children who were less than 4 years of age at the time of the
sibling birth could not recall the event. They believe that
the child must master language sufficiently to rehearse the
event in order to remember it and that they must have certain
schemes or scripts established so that they know what is not
normal. They agree with Nelson (1988) that most children
develop well-organized scripts for their daily lives at around
the age of 3-4 years. Absence of a script for daily life led
to absence for memory of the unusual event of the birth of a
sibling.
In a more recent study similar to Sheingold and Tenney's,
Usher and Neisser (1993) asked college students about four
events (birth of a sibling, hospitalization, moving, and death
of family member) occurring during the ages of 1 to 5 years.
They found that the offset of amnesia is not the same for all
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events. That is, it depends on the nature of the event
itself. Birth of a sibling and hospitalization occurring at
age 2 were remembered whereas family deaths and moving were
not remembered until after age 3. Their results indicated
that certain elements did not contribute to the offset of the
amnesia while others did. First, reported affective state was
unrelated to the amount of recall. Second, the influence of
access to family stories and photographs depended upon age at
time of the event. For children less than 3 years of age
access to such items resulted in less recall. But the recall
of children 4 and 5 years of age was strengthened with access.
Third, recency of the last opportunity for rehearsal of the
event was unrelated to amount of recall. And fourth, the
frequency of the reported event rehearsal (both overt recall
and covert reflection) was positively correlated with recall.
Usher and Neisser suggest that amnesia for events in the first
few years of life is the result of poor understanding of the
event and the significance of the event. They believe that,
"Where there is no schematic understanding of individual
events and no schematic life narrative to interpret them,
little recall can be expected" (Usher and Neisser, 1993, p.
164) . Loftus (1993) cautions researchers not to accept Usher
and Neisser' s results lightly. She suggests that these
"memories" may be more educated guesses than true memories,
based on general knowledge of what must have been. Nonethe-
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less, the Usher and Neisser conclusion about the effect of
schematic understanding is still important.
As Farrar and Goodman (1990) note, the influence of
scripts or schemas is not always positive. Scripts can help
or aid retrieval of an episodic event by lending support for
prototypical behavior, thus guiding the establishment of an
episodic representation. However, scripts can also impede
retrieval of specific details as memory may be subjected to
distortion towards the expected. Farrar and Goodman's results
allowed them to conclude that younger children are more script
dependent than older children for many memory tasks. This is
in agreement with Nelson's claim that the establishment of a
script is necessary before a child can have an episodic
representation or autobiographical memory of an event. As
scripts are beginning to be more defined, they are depended
upon more for understanding situations and thus influence
memory more. One caveat, however, that Farrar and Goodman
note, is that for individuals of all ages, schema dependency
is a function of the complexity of the event encountered. The
processes of script confirmation and deployment go on
throughout one's life. Confirmation of a script occurs when
a situation is encountered for which a script is already
formed and in the person's repertoire while script deployment
is the process that allows script consistent information to
require little attention so that attention can be focused on
those elements that are inconsistent with the script. Thus,
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people attempt to first confirm a script and then consider the
discrepancies between the script and the event, which then
form the elements of episodic memory. Farrar and Goodman in
their experiments exploring episodic and scriptal memory found
that younger children have trouble deploying scripts, thus
giving them less of an episodic memory ability. Nelson's
claim that children are incapable of autobiographical memory
before they have script ability is an additional explanation
for infantile amnesia which would posit that there is no
memory to be recalled as the child is unable to organize the
information at time of encoding.
Price and Goodman (1990) examined the development of
scripts in girls, ages 2-1/2, 4, and 5-1/2 years, for a
recurring lab event. From their results, they draw four major
conclusions. First, during the early stages of script
formation, with age more actions are included in scripts.
Second, although causally related activities are sequenced
together at all ages, temporal ordering is age-related.
Third, hierarchical structure of event actions develops over
these years. Fourth, younger children's scripts are
influenced by the method of probing while older children's are
not.
Repeated experience has been found to have a positive
effect on memory performance on a variety of different tasks,
especially when it is spaced over time (Cornell, 1980; Fivush
& Hamond, 1989; Hudson & Sheffield, March 1993; Toppino,
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1993). But it has also been shown that multiple experiences
do not necessarily enhance performance, and this may be
because the script for the event changes over time with the
repeated experiences.
Studies by Hudson and Nelson (1986) demonstrate that 3 -
and 5-year-old children draw from general event knowledge and
scripts. Familiarity with events was found to have a strong
effect on both general and episodic representations. After
one experience, children's recall was very episodic in
content. But with more experience with the event, children's
recall was more general and contained less details. However,
when an event was more personally meaningful, a more detailed
account was given. Hudson and Nelson believe that these
results support a modified constructive account of the
development of autobiographical memory.
Similar results were found by Myers et al. (1994).
Memory performance at 60 months of age was not dependent
solely upon the number of prior experiences. The group of
children with multiple experiences at 10 months who were
tested at 14 months and who also participated in the 32-month
follow-up and, thus had the most experience of all groups, did
not demonstrate the highest level of memory. In fact,
children with only one previous experience whether it was at
14 months or 32 months of age performed better, and those
children who had two experiences (at 14 and 32 months)
performed equivalently. The highest level of overall memory
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was demonstrated by the children with multiple experiences at
10 months who were then tested at 14 months but did not
participate in the 32-month follow-up. it appears then that
in this study, multiple experiences helped children whose
experiences were of more or less the same event. At 10 and 14
months for instance, the infants' experience was most similar.
And it appears that the most repeated similar experience
established the most durable representations or memory.
However, if the multiple experiences were in vastly different
events, such as 10 and 14 months versus 32 months, memory was
negatively impacted. Myers et al. suggested that this
occurred due to changes in the children's script for the
event, i.e., a specific "learning-how-to-operate-a-toy-in-a-
tent" script might have become a more general "playing-with-
toys" script.
The current literature, as this brief review illustrates,
strongly suggests that a dialectical relationship exists
between scripts and memory. Future work will let us determine
more exactly what influences what and how.
Reminders and Reactivation
As adults most of us have encountered a certain sight,
sound, or smell which has then brought forth a flood of
memories. It does not happen every time, just sometimes. Why
is it that certain stimuli are effective reminder cues while
others are not? These reminders are an interesting phenomenon
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in general, but even more so when considering the early
memories of infants and young children. Would we be able as
adults to "tap" more early memories if we were provided with
the right" reminder? Would children's memories "improve" if
we provided the right reminder? it is critical while
exploring the nature of early memories to have an
understanding of the effects of reminders and the reactivation
phenomenon, and it is these issues which I will address in the
current study.
Animal Studies
Campbell and Jaynes (1966)
,
working with animals, are
credited with beginning the exploration into reminders. Their
work with rats used a procedure they labeled reinstatement, in
which partial practice or repetition of an experience is
enough to maintain a learned response at its earlier high
level, but is not enough to produce any effect in
inexperienced animals. Twenty-five-day-old rats learned to
fear the black compartment of a cage by experiencing shocks.
During the next month, reminders, which consisted of 2-s
shocks of the same intensity, were given at 7
,
14, and 21 days
after training and the animals were then tested at 28 days.
Results of testing illustrated that rats with the early
experience and given reminders demonstrated significantly more
fear of the black compartment than rats who had the same early
experience but did not receive the reminder shocks, and also
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more than those rats who did receive the reminders but did not
have the early experience. Campbell and Jaynes consider this
reinstatement phenomenon to be a major mechanism by which
early experiences are retrieved and even incorporated into an
adult's memory. They believe that the language-based culture
of man, including parental reminders and taboos, allow
frequent reinstatement of experience, which permits memory of
it.
Campbell and Spear's (1972) review of the animal
literature supported some basic "common sense" assumptions.
Studies up to this time showed that the longer the duration of
the reinstatement, the better the retention. Studies also
showed that reinstatement of the conditioned stimulus is more
effective than reinstatement of the unconditioned stimulus.
Spear's (1973) continuing examination of the reactivation
paradigm expanded our understanding of the nature of the
reminder. He states that reactivation does not constitute an
entire training trial nor does it require the exhibiting of
the learned task. Also, any new learning caused by the
reactivation is unable to explain the retention enhancement.
Effective reactivation need not include the conditioned
stimulus but can utilize contextual cues from the original
learning environment. Bouton and Bolles (1985) in their work
with rats also found that contextual stimuli have an important
role in reinstatement.
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Spear differentiates four types of reactivation
treatments which should be discussed, as they are crucial for
understanding the manipulation in infant studies and the
current work. These include warmup, reinstatement, direct
reactivation, and implicit reactivation. Warmup is "the
consequences of reactivation treatments that immediately
precede the retention task, or in some cases, the consequences
of the first few trials" (1973, p.169). Spear reserves the
term reinstatement to refer to several reactivation treatments
that are evenly dispersed over the time interval between
training and testing. Direct reactivation involves a single
reactivation treatment given some time between the training
and the testing, but does not have to be immediately preceding
the test. Implicit reactivation involves a single treatment
during the interval that includes a manipulation intended to
modify the memory but which is not assessed until the
retention.
Warm-up treatments are often unsuccessful according to
Spear, especially with animals. He believes that often this
is the case because a number of cues of the training session
are not noticed by the animal and, therefore, are ineffective
as reminders. But this is actually a reason all types of
reactivation treatments can be unsuccessful. Another possible
hypothesis for this ineffectiveness is the need for motor
activities in order to bring forth the memory. A retention
deficit, called the Kamin effect, has been found in direct
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reactivation treatments with animals if the interval between
the reminder and test is one to six hours. This is to say,
the reminder is effective if testing occurs within one hour or
after six hours. Consequently, retention evaluated a day
later can be greater than that just a few hours after
reactivation. Spear and his colleagues in some of their work
with animals have attributed this effect to the influence of
the hormone ACTH. During stressful times, the hormone is
inhibited and it takes time for the system to become adjusted
to the stress level and achieve balance. These effects remind
us that it is necessary to consider physiological and
psychological states at both the time of training and the time
of testing and their possible influence on the retrieval of
memory
.
According to Spear, "the effectiveness of retrieval
depends upon the availability of a sufficient number or kind
of retrieval cues at the moment expression of memory is
required" (1973, p. 181). Smith and Spear (1979) examined the
effect of reactivation following retroactive interference. In
their study, 60-day-old rats received a source of retroactive
interference with no shock 24 hours after training and then a
reactivation treatment or no reactivation treatment at all.
The reactivation treatment involved two 55-ms shocks
administered 10-min prior to a test session that occurred at
either 24 hours or seven days after training. For both test
sessions, the reactivation treatment effectively increased
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retention. They concluded that "it appears that this
reactivation treatment must have aroused common affective or
stimulus properties with the target memory in order to elicit
retrieval of that memory" (Smith & Spear, 1979, p. 292).
Continuing work by Spear and his colleagues have revealed
some results that are hard to explain and go against the
ear li-er "common sense" assumptions, in experiments performed
by Miller, Jagielo, and Spear (1990 and 1991) with 18-day-old
rats, they found that direct reactivation with the reinforced
stimulus or an implicit reactivation with a novel stimulus did
not act as an effective reminder for a 3 hour test. Possible
explanation for this is the change of the stimulus from
training to reactivation. The reinforced stimulus during
training was followed by a shock, but it was not during the
reactivation treatment. A novel reactivation stimulus was
effective for longer retention (24 hours) supporting the
Miller et al. (1991) notion that "for a stimulus to serve as
effective prior-cuing treatment, it need not match the stimuli
present at the time of training but rather must match the
subjects' internal representation of those stimuli" (p. 257).
So, for example, a novel odor may be an effective reminder,
but only if the concept of odor was encoded at training.
Reactivation Studies with Infants
With the exception of the studies of long-term memory for
infancy events mentioned above, the majority of human work
40
related to reminders has been carried out by Rovee-Collier and
her colleagues. As previously described, she employs the
mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm in which infants 2-6
months old learn to manipulate a mobile by footkicks. Rovee-
Collier ' s view regarding reminders is that a reminder must
involve some sort of reinstatement of the training context.
She agrees with Campbell and Jaynes that reinstatement is the
possible mechanism by which the effects of early experience
are perpetuated. This then, according to Rovee-Collier, gives
memory the function it needs to continue to exist. Although
the reinstatement procedure as described by Campbell and
Jaynes contained repeated exposures to the training context,
Rovee-Collier employs single reactivations since Spear and
Parsons (1976) found that single exposure would suffice in
reactivating the memory. Rovee-Collier chose to provide a
reactivation treatment 24-hours before retention testing. She
attributes her choice of this 24-hour reminder to Spear and
Parsons since they chose such a delay at first to minimize
unconditioned consequences of the treatment that might occur
if the reminder was presented only a few minutes prior to
testing. All of these procedures rest on the assumption that
memories do not disappear but that they lie dormant until they
are reactivated.
In her earliest studies, Rovee-Collier and her colleagues
trained three-month-old infants on two consecutive days to
operate a mobile. A reactivation treatment given to some
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infants 13 days later involved a three-minute noncontingent
exposure to a moving mobile. All infants were tested 24 hours
after that for 14-day retention. Two control groups were
used — one receiving training but no reactivation and one
receiving reactivation but no training, as described in
^u^^van (1982). Results showed that the experimental group
performed at 14 days at the same high level as one day after
training. Their performance was much better than either of
the control groups, indicating that it was the combination of
the reminder and prior training that permitted demonstration
of the memory.
One question that arises is whether or not this reminder
worked because of the time interval between the original
training and testing. Using a similar procedure to that
described above, again with three-month-old infants, retention
tests were administered 28 and 35 days after training, with a
three minute noncontingent reminder cue given 24 hours prior
to testing. Rovee-Collier and Hayne (1987) report that the
reminders were effective for testing at 28 days but overall as
a group they were not effective at 35 days. Parallel work
with two-month-old infants found that even though they
exhibited poor performance on the original 24-hour test, with
a reminder 24 hrs before the 14-day retention test, they
performed better. From these data Rovee-Collier concluded
that it is not the age of the infant which constrains the
effectiveness of a reminder. Rather, it is that memories
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which have been forgotten longer may be more difficult to
access after a single reminder. Thus, length of the delay is
a factor in whether or not this three-minute reminder will be
effective.
In addition to the length of time prior to retention, it
appears that the length of the reminder itself is important.
Rovee-Collier used a three minute reminder because she feels
that the result of the reminder is not an immediate expression
of the memory desired but that it takes a while to retrieve
the memory — a warm up effect that she claims has been
documented both in human and animal literature. But why three
minutes? She claims that this length of time is needed
because infants lack the extensive networks of associations,
particularly language-based associations, which facilitate
retrieval. But is this true? This does not correspond with
the animal literature. Reminders used by Spear and his
colleagues have been as short as a portion of a second.
Is a 24-hour reminder cue the only type that is
effective? Rovee-Collier administered 24-hour reminder cues
because in addition to Spear and Parsons' work, her previous
studies found 15-minute and one-hour cues to be totally
ineffective and eight-hour cues to be effective for some
infants but not for the majority of the group. She attributes
part of this difference possibly to sleep as a reduction of
external demand on cognitive availability. But she does not
adequately explain this hypothesis nor does she really
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interpret her results in light of it. We do not know how long
her subjects slept, if they all slept the same amount of time,
what type of sleep they experienced, etc. Surely, 24 hours
allows for more possibilities of encountering other stimuli.
Would not some other time delay be the most effective if sleep
was indeed the determinant?
Boiler et al. (1990) tested six-month—old infants in the
mobile conjugate paradigm using a two-minute reminder at 30
minutes, 1 hour, 2 hours, 4 hours, 8 hours, or 24 hours before
testing or no reminder at all. Testing occurred at 20 days
for the control group and 21 days for all others. They found
that the control group and the 30-minute group showed no
retention at all. The 1-hour and 2-hour groups' retention was
poor. Retention for the 4-hour group was excellent while the
8-hour group showed no retention. Retention was also evident
at 24 hours. The other experiments reported by Boiler et al.
(1990) on the effect of context on remembering all used a 24-
hour reminder cue. They conclude "that 6-month-old infants
are unable to access either an original memory... or a
reactivation memory ... after lengthy intervals" (p. 778) even
though 3-month-old infants are capable of doing so. They
attribute this to rapid modification of memories. But is this
really the case? Perhaps this is due to the change from a
three-minute reminder to a two-minute one. Perhaps it is
because of the additional week of time elapsing before
testing. Perhaps the 24-hour reminder cue is not effective
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for this age group due to something other than the
modification of memories. One might question why they did not
use a four-hour reminder, which they found to be the most
effective in their first experiment. Their conclusion seems
inappropriate without further research into the nature of
differences in effectiveness of reminder cues at three and six
months of age.
Greco, Hayne, and Rovee-Collier (1990), working with
three—month—old infants in the same mobile conjugate paradigm,
found that the reminder itself did not have to be exactly as
it was in the training session. They found that a reminder
from the same category as the training session could be an
effective reminder as long as the training included use of
variable stimuli.
Using the same mobile reinforcement paradigm, recent
results reported by Hayne and Findlay (1993, March) illustrate
the effectiveness of the training context as a reminder.
Working with 3-month-old infants, Hayne and Findlay found that
for up to four weeks, providing a reminder cue of the training
context alone was as effective a reminder as providing the
mobile in the context. In fact the memory retrieved after the
context alone reminder was as specific as the memory retrieved
after the mobile/context reminder. Exposure to the context
was able to cue retrieval of other attributes of the memory of
the original event. Hayne and Findlay concluded that:
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...preverbal infants rely heavily on contextual cuesto organize and retrieve information they have learned
about the world. In this way, context provides the
"glue" that binds similar events together. (1993 March
P-6). '
An additional finding of interest that has been reported
by Rovee-Collier and her colleagues involves features and
feature relations. Bhatt (1993, March) reported that infants
can remember perceptual features even when they no longer
remember feature relations (or how the features associate with
one another) . This result was interpreted to mean that even
though both the features and the relations are part of the
memory representation, the individual features are maintained
independently of the relations and in fact are given a
privileged status.
Recently, Hayne and Rovee-Collier (1995) conducted a
series of experiments with 3-mo-old infants trained and tested
2 weeks later with reminders given before test. In the first
experiment, they found that while a moving mobile reminder
facilitated memory neither a stationary mobile reminder nor a
context-only reminder did so. Experiment 2 found that the
original training mobile acted as a better reminder than a
novel mobile even when the mobile used at test was the novel
one. The influence of the training context was further
explored in Experiment 3. Bumper liners were added to the
crib to provide a distinctive context during training. Groups
were all reminded with the training mobile and context. At
test, however, groups were either tested with the training
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mobile in the training context, training mobile in novel
context, a novel mobile in the training context, or a novel
mobile in a novel context. The group tested with the training
mobile in the original training context had a higher level of
retention that the other groups. Apparently, given this age
group and retention interval, the conditions of the original
training experience specify cues needed for retrieval.
In all, Rovee-Collier ' s adaptation of animal paradigms
for reminders and reactivation to infant studies has shed much
additional light on the abilities of young infants. For
example, the specificity of an effective reminder depends on
the level of forgetting and the original training experience.
An effective reminder must be highly specific to what the
infant originally encoded. This is in accordance with
Tulving's encoding specificity principle (Tulving, 1983).
Two main points should be remembered from Rovee-Collier '
s
work. First, not all aspects of the original training context
are equally effective as reminder cues. Second, the longer
the time delay from training to testing, the greater the need
for the context of the reminder to match that of the training
sessions
.
Reenactment and Reminder Studies with Toddlers
Recent work by Sheffield and Hudson (1994) examining the
effects of reminders in toddlers have found that reactivation
of a portion of an experience 24 hours before test aided
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recall 8-10 weeks after the original experience for 14-18-
month-old subjects. Their subjects were trained on 6
activities in a 20-minute session. The activities, similar to
those Bauer employed, involved sequencing actions on simple
stimuli. At the 10-minute reactivation session, subjects were
exposed to the props for 3 of the 6 activities, and allowed to
manipulate them before viewing the experimenter model the 3
sequences. Although they reported that subjects were
discouraged from playing with the props after the modeling,
they did not report compliance or noncompliance. In other
words, although the researchers describe their reminder as
passive, we cannot be sure, since they do not report if
subjects reenacted the activities during the times before and
after modelling by the experimenter. They found that children
with the reactivation treatment performed more of the 6
activities at test than their peers who received either
training with no reactivation, or reactivation with no
training. However, it should be noted that even the children
given reactivation did not perform at ceiling. Sheffield and
Hudson conclude that toddlers encode components of an event
associatively
,
and consequently are able to remember
unreminded activities of an event when passively reminded of
other event activities. However, such a strong conclusion may
not be warranted. As suggested above, it is possible that the
children reenacted some activities of the event, and it was a
reenactment rather than a reminder effect.
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Hudson and Sheffield (under review) continued exploring
the effects of reenactment on young children's memory for
elicited imitation tasks. in a series of experiments, they
considered the following four questions: Are reenactment
effects seen in 18-mo olds? How are reenactment effects
by the timing of reenactment? How does partial
reenactment affect recall? What are the effects of the timing
of event reenactment over very long periods of time?
Their results indicated that reenactment at 2 weeks
facilitated performance on tests either 6 or 8 weeks later.
Additionally, children with reenactment at 8 weeks and a test
at 16 weeks performed more activities spontaneously (before
being probed) than those children with reenactment at 2 weeks
and a test at 10 weeks and those children with no reenactment
at all. The two reenactment groups performed equivalently
once probes were introduced. However, the reenactment groups
differed in their performance on tests 6 mos after their last
visit. The group who experienced reenactment at 8 weeks had
a higher level of performance. Consistent with their previous
results (Sheffield & Hudson, 1994), partial reenactment of 4
of the 8 activities was found to reinstate memory for the
entire experience.
Ryder, Sheffield, and Hudson (1995, March) contrasted the
effects of a video reminder and reenactment on 18-mo olds'
memory. A video reminder, showing another child performing
the event activities, given 2 weeks after the initial
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experience was not facilitative at a test 10 weeks later,
while reenactment at 2 weeks was facilitative after 10 weeks.
However, the video reminder presented 15 min before a 10 week
test was found to be highly effective. Ryder et al. concluded
that toddlers were able to use the representational
information available in the video, but that this information
fades more quickly for them than does the effect of
reenactment. This may not be surprising given that the video
reminder involves another child performing the activities,
while in reenactment, the child, him- or herself, acts. One
interesting question that arises, therefore, is whether a
reminder showing each child a video of his or her own training
would better facilitate performance.
Bauer, Hertsgaard, and Wewerka (1995) tested the efficacy
of verbal and nonverbal reminders on 15-month olds' recall of
simple event sequences. Children were taught six 3-step
sequences involving familiar and novel events. Recall was
tested one week later after exposure to a reminder treatment.
Reminder treatments were either nonverbal reminders such as
modelling the first step or displaying the final goal or a
verbal reminder of labeling. A control group experienced the
test session only and received a verbal suggestion. They
found that the verbal reminder was just as able to facilitate
performance as the nonverbal reminders. In fact, they found
that the addition of nonverbal reminding to verbal reminding
did not enhance recall more than recall was enhanced with the
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verbal reminder alone. In a second study employing a delay
interval of one month, and nonverbal reminders, they found
facilitated recall only for events involving enabling
relations and not for those with arbitrary relations.
Reinstatement Studies with Preschoolers
Walkenfeld and Nelson (1995, March) also considered the
effects of verbal reminders on children's memory. They were
interested in whether 3- and 4-year-old children would benefit
from verbal reinstatement in their treasure hunt game event.
Reinstatement was provided 1 week after the initial experience
with the test conducted 2 weeks thereafter. The verbal
reinstatement group outperformed the control group who did not
receive the 1 week interview. It is possible that this
difference may not be due to the verbal reinstatement
manipulation but rather due to just returning to the
University for a second visit. Walkenfeld and Nelson believe
that more than this is involved, however, as they argue that
the recall of the children in the reinstatement group
indicated that they had reorganized their recall within the
framework of the reinstatement interview.
As mentioned previously, a reminder cue was used by
Perris et al. (1990). To reiterate here, they found that a 3-
second reminder of the original experimental context given to
2-1/2 year old children one-half hour prior to testing
resulted in enhanced performance. Why was this ever so brief
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reminder, so close to testing, effective for 2-1/2-year-olds
two years after the event?
Reminders and their role in memory retrieval are
fascinating areas of study, but as is evident from this
review, our knowledge of them is still quite limited.
However, we definitely know that for effective reactivation,
the stimuli used in the reminder must have been present and
noticed during acquisition or training (Spear, 1976) . Only
aspects of the event that are attended to or noticed can be
encoded. Aspects of a target event that a researcher believes
important may not necessarily be noticed by or of interest to
the subject. Thus, an inability to recall or recognize such
elements at a later time, or benefit from a reminder including
them, may not be evidence of a retrieval failure, since no
memory may have been formed in the first place. In addition,
the effects of a reminder may be dependent upon the original
event, the nature of the context reinstated and possibly many
more factors.
Development of Narrative Skills and Reminiscing
The current study considers reminiscing, i.e., verbal
discussion of components of the event, as a reminder.
Therefore, it is necessary to briefly review the literature on
development of narrative skills, and the effects of
reminiscing on recall.
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The definitions of narratives span the spectrum from
simplistic to extremely complex. Umiker-Sebeok (1979) defines
narratives as referring to any verbal description of one or
more past events. Even a simple 2-word utterance informing
the listener that something happened would qualify. Bruner and
Lucariello (1989), on the other hand, consider personal
narratives as not just reporting what happened, but including
a psychological perspective towards those happenings in
attempts to make sense of experience. They see the use of
language as helping children develop through practice in
decontextualized procedures, so that speaking becomes
different from action and affect. Narrativization for them,
in effect, provides a means for the child to differentiate and
then reintegrate action, affect, and cognition.
Regardless of the specific definition of narrative one
uses, there are certain elements that are required. In
effect, narrative production can be seen as a cognitive and
linguistic task that draws on different kinds of knowledge
(Hudson & Shapiro, 1991). Included in this set are the
abilities to: organize activity, plan discourse, and not be
distracted from one's own utterances (Eisenberg, 1985) ; use
referential communication so that the event can be placed in
context, such that the listener is provided with the who,
where, and when orientating information (McNamee, 1987;
Peterson, 1990); provide an evaluative understanding which
provides the emotional tone and texture of experience (Fivush,
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1993). Extremely important in narratives is the temporal
order and the need for coherent structure.
The conversational narrative by the nature of its
structure requires additional abilities. Conversations are
cooperative activity that presuppose the intention to
communicate. McTear (1985) describes the structure of
conversations as dynamic, reflecting the joint effort of
participants. In order to hold a conversation, there needs to
be an initiation of it which involves both attention getting
and attention directing. Attention getting devices include
gaze direction, body language like leaning over, words such as
"hey" or "look," pointing, increasing vowel length, increasing
volume, and articulating more precisely. There is an
interaction involved in this initiation and management of
conversation. If the expected response is not forthcoming, or
if the response received is unsatisfactory, then according to
McTear, there needs to be a reinitiation which indicates the
awareness of the violation of discourse expectation. This
reinitiation does not usually or only involve repetitions but
also includes changes in prosodic pattern, attention getting
words, vocatives, and gaze.
Turntaking is inherent in the conversational process and
involves engaging in reciprocal acts of initiating and
responding. It presupposes social and cognitive requirements
including the need or desire to interact with others, the
ability to differentiate self from others, coordinate actions
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and purposes, and represent to self the internal representa-
tion of others in order to recognize their intentions (Snow,
1977) .
Developmental Course of Narrative Ability
What is the developmental course for narrative ability?
Snow (1977) sees the beginning of the process of
conversational narrative development to be present in the
young infant. At 3 months, adults respond to the child's
behaviors and gestures like smiling, burps, vocalizing. It is
obvious that the child's role is minimal here and does not
really provide the basis for turntaking but mothers are
especially persistent. Games such as peek-a-boo can be seen
as a method for teaching turntaking (Garbarino & Stott, 1989)
.
By 7 months, babies are more active partners and initiate
"conversations" by smiling, laughing, and crying/protest.
Parents do not respond to all vocalizations but only high
quality ones like babbling. Although the infant has a larger
repertoire of behaviors that could be use in turntaking, she
still fails to always take a turn. Consequently, there are a
lot of maternal repairs such as repeating and simplifying. By
12 months, turntaking by the infant is more reliable as she is
responding more to maternal utterances as well as initiating
more of her own. And by 18 months, the child takes turns
quite often, although still not perfectly. At this point,
there is a strong impression of real conversation in terms of
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the frequency of speaker switching and apparent effectiveness
of communication. This is dependent, however, on the mother's
willingness to follow up on any opening provided by the child
and fill in for the child.
There is continued development towards more flexible and
elaborate strategies especially in qualitative terms of more
effective use of means of justifying requests and responses.
Thus, there is development from the tendency to use more
closed exchanges consisting of initiation and response
sequences to more open exchange structures where exchanges are
linked by utterances with a dual function — responding to a
preceding utterance and initiating or providing further
response — which make each turn longer (McTear, 1985) .
Turntaking, although quite established by the preschool years,
is not really orderly until school age, at which point it is
more or less adult-like (McTear, 1985) . During the preschool
years it is not unusual to see children taking turns in
talking but really not holding a conversation, as their
statements are not related to one another (Nelson & Gruendel,
1979) . It is only when both parties share context, so to
speak, and have conversational structure and content knowledge
that true conversations can take place. This is one reason
why parents have been found to be able to hold conversations
and get more and sophisticated dialogue out of their children
than other people can — they share a context. However, it
has also been shown that at times strangers are more able to
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get young children to recall events (Fivush, Hamond, Harsch,
Singer, & Wolf, 1991) . Young children often fail to see if
they have their partner's attention and have trouble directing
attention when the object of conversation is not present in
the physical environment (McTear, 1985) . Of course, the
sophistication of conversation continues to increase. Older
children are sensitive to the social identity of the partner
to which they are speaking (Fine, 1978)
.
Between 20-30 months of age, children are able to give
personal narratives at some level (Feldman, 1989) . Two-year
olds rely heavily on support and cues from adults. Fivush,
Gray, and Fromhoff (1987) found 2-year-old children were able
to participate in conversations about past events including
those experienced recently (within 3 months) and those more
distant (more than 6 months) . In fact, one child even
reported an event occurring 10 months previously. By 3 years
of age, children can independently give information and
initiate narratives on their own. They are also quite able to
provide scriptal narratives about familiar events such as
birthday parties (Nelson & Gruendel, 1986).
The basic knowledge of relations needed for narratives is
developed pretty early, at least in a rudimentary manner
(Lucariello, 1990; Sprott, 1993, March). These personal
narratives require awareness of certain dimensions of
narrative structure in order to develop. Hudson and Shapiro
(1991) talk about four types of knowledge and skills that
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affect narrative development. First, there is content
knowledge including the knowledge of scripts, social
interactions, etc. Structural knowledge about the different
components of different types of narratives is also important,
as is microlinguistic knowledge, including knowledge of
connectives, tense, and anaphoric references. And finally,
contextual knowledge, such as what the narrator believes about
the function of the narrative in a particular elicitation,
affects development.
Eisenberg (1985) identified three phases of development
in personal narratives about past experiences. First, there
is the dependency on adult participation. Then there is
script-based discussion of elements common to many instances
of an event, rather than those occurring in an unique episode
of a specific event. Finally, talk about unique occurrences
emerges. This talk at first tends to be largely unorganized,
but becomes structured with development. Many narratives of
children at early ages are almost devoid of contextual and
orienting information (Peterson, 1990) . In fact, explicit
reference to persons is something seldom seen in the
narratives of children under 3-1/2 years of age, and increases
slowly with age. Even older children (8-9 yrs) do not always
identify people in their narratives.
Astington (1990) sees a crucial change occurring between
2—4 years of age, which involves the development of an
awareness of mental states in themselves and in others. This
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is a development of the ability to represent relationships
themselves. By 4 years, children not only have beliefs, but
also beliefs about beliefs. It is not until this time that
children can begin to understand what is called the dual
landscape of narratives — events and actions in reality and
the perception of that reality. Consequently, it is not until
5-8 years that children have metarepresentational abilities to
ascribe propositional attitudes to others by using verbs that
create subjunctive realities. Additionally, the fit between
the structure of knowledge and memory and the structure of the
narrative genre is important in determining narrative
coherence for young children. Older children are better able
to restructure knowledge into different types of narratives
(McKeough, 1992)
.
The role of mother-child interaction is very important in
this development of narrative ability (Garbarino & Stott,
1989; McNamee, 1987; McTear, 1985; Reese, Haden, & Fivush,
1992) . This interaction provides the scaffolding necessary to
allow the parent to teach the child what should be in a
narrative, and at first there is a coproduction or
coarticulation of narratives. Early on, it is the caretaker
who structures the interaction, provides most of the content,
and makes repairs (McNamee, 1987; McTear, 1985; Reese, Haden
& Fivush, 1992) . The adult can organize the conversation so
that the child responds to questions and can develop a fuller
narrative than if not prompted and these prompts implicitly
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demonstrate for the child what elements should be included
when asked to recount events. in a way, the child is an
unknowing apprentice as the experience with the adult plays a
role in developing the child's awareness of demands and
functions of narratives. This can be viewed in light of
Vygotsky's zone of proximal development, that he defines as
the range between what the child can and will do alone and
what s/he can do with assistance providing contextual support.
The child learns from the adult and transfers this knowledge
to the self (McLane, 1987; Vygotsky, 1986). As Fivush (1991)
points out, the ways which mothers structure conversations
about past events in early development are related to
subsequent abilities of children to structure personal
narratives. Children seem to be learning how to organize
temporally complex accounts and also to include particular
types of narrative information such as orientations and
evaluations in these early adult structured conversations
(McCabe & Peterson, 1991)
.
Maternal style of narrative instruction has been found to
be influential in the development of the child's memory
abilities, as well as their narrative style (Reese, Haden &
Fivush, 1992) . They define two very distinct styles. Mothers
who are high elaborative tend to present questions and
statements about past events which add new information to the
conversation, one that neither they nor their child has
previously uttered, while mothers who are low elaborative tend
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to repeat themselves without providing additional information.
Thus
,
it is not surprising that these disparate styles
differential affect children's memory and narrative style.
Reese and colleagues have also found that the influence of the
mother on the child's narrative ability is greater than the
child's influence on the mother during an early narrative
phase (40-46 months)
,
but that by 56 and 70 months, there is
bidirectionality. That is, the child's skill level affects
the mother's style, as well as the mother affecting the child.
Reminiscing Studies
Hudson has examined the effect of reminiscing with
mothers and others on verbal reports of memories. In an early
case study, Hudson (1991) concluded that repeated talk about
15 different events, discussed 2-6 times each when her child
was between 2 0 and 24 months of age, did not affect her
daughter's recall. She reports a low percentage (<50%) of
overlap in what was discussed each time. Her daughter
continually recalled new information even over long retention
intervals. This inconsistency of recall is consistent with
Fivush et al. (1991) who conclude that young children are not
accessing and recounting the same information each time.
However, it is possible that the low overlap may have been due
to the unstructured nature of the Hudson conversations.
Events were brought up for discussion in different ways and
61
with different information provided by the parent on each
occasion.
In a more recent study, Hudson (1993) examined the
effects of maternal elicitation style, repeated recall, and
retention interval on autobiographical memory of young 2-year
olds. Mothers chose a number of events to discuss with their
children and did so once a week for four weeks. Two weeks
later, an experimenter discussed these same events, as well as
additional events, with each child. Hudson found that in
conversation with the experimenter, children were more willing
to recall events that they had previously discussed with their
mothers. Hudson concludes that her results provide limited
support for the hypothesis that verbally recalling events can
improve children's recall.
Unfortunately, neither the events discussed nor the
contents of discussion have been very well controlled in any
of the reminiscence or maternal-aided recall studies.
Children typically discussed a number of different events
chosen by parents, and these events were usually different
from child to child. In addition, external permanent records
were not usually available. Moreover, parents were given
little instruction on how to conduct the reminiscence. Often,
if an event was discussed repeatedly, it was discussed
differently each time. The finding of little consistency in
recall over time is not therefore very surprising. Finally,
all studies examining the effectiveness of reminiscence have
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used verbal reports as the single dependent
effect of reminiscing on behavioral indices of
been assessed. At least some of these
limitations will be corrected in the work to
measure. The
memory has not
methodological
follow.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SILLY SOUP EVENT
The preceding review of the literature provides ample
evidence that knowledge of early memory has been amplified in
the past few years. Nonetheless there remains much to
uncover. The goal of the present line of research is to
extend our understanding of some of the issues related to
memory processes and expression through exploring means of
facilitating memory.
Much of the prior work investigating early memory has
tended to follow one of two approaches: Either controlled but
simple laboratory tests are utilized (e.g., ordering short
sequences of stimuli or actions) or various naturalistic
events are sampled (which by their nature are often not
controlled events or events with objective external permanent
records) . In response to the limitations of such
methodologies, we have created a fairly complex and complete
laboratory event for young children. The event can stand
alone as an unique personal experience, similar to ones
naturally encountered, and possibly provide autobiographical
significance, but in addition it allows us to experimentally
manipulate elements, and chart the saliency and duration of
specific stimuli and components of event experience.
Furthermore, since the event takes place at the University, it
allows for video- and audio-recording of it for a permanent
record.
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The event involves a cooking episode complete with a host
Teddy Bear ("Teddy"), a goal (making "silly soup"), a series
of episodes with animal friends bringing hidden soup
ingredients, and an unexpected outcome (a spill)
. The
experimental room contains a play kitchen area at one end, and
a puppet theater at the other. Children sit facing the
experimenter with their backs to the puppet theater and are
introduced to Teddy who wants them to help him make his
favorite dish. They learn that a doorbell sound emanating from
the front of the room signals the appearance of an animal
puppet in the theater behind them. The animal puppet and the
ingredient he brought are named. Children are taught to
approach the theater, rotate a turntable, search for the
hidden ingredient first in a corresponding prop, and then
locate it in a drawer beneath. Children then return to the
table and add the ingredient to the mixing bowl. This
procedure is repeated until 6 different animals deliver 6
different ingredients. The session ends when Teddy smells the
contents of the bowl and spills them onto the floor.
By using a large cohesive complex event such as this, it
is possible to explore the nature of the representations of
which 2-year olds are capable. It is possible that they might
represent just isolated specific associations or motor action
sequences which have both been documented with infants, but
here might be unconnected to the big picture of the event as
a whole. Or, it is possible that children even this young may
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represent dimensions of a coherent overall organization
including components of the event goal and outcome. in
addition to this general interest in representation, in the
first study with this event (Speaker & Myers, 1995, March)
four specific questions were of interest. First, would 2-year
olds enjoy the task and be able to participate? Second, what
would they remember of the event when the event was repeated
later the same day or after 2 weeks? Third, what would they
remember of the event after 4 months had elapsed? And
finally, would the timing of the repetition affect their long-
term memory?
Two-year-old children (N=32) participated in the Silly
Soup event, and were tested first during an event repetition
either on the same day or after 2 weeks. The procedures for
the same-day test and 2-week test were identical. After open-
ended questioning in the reception room, the experimenter
asked "What does Teddy want to do?" and began the routine by
surreptitiously ringing the doorbell. If no response was
forthcoming, the experimenter provided verbal and/or
behavioral cues as required, culminating in reexposure of the
ingredients and reenactment of the spill. All children
returned after 4 months for a long-term memory assessment, at
which time age-matched controls (N=16) were also tested. The
4-month test procedure was similar to the first test, except
that the experimenter never drew attention to the puppet
theater. If the children did not turn towards and approach the
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theater and find the ingredient, the experimenter produced a
ingredient inconspicuously from a box at her feet.
How did the children perform? The mean number of trials
each child oriented towards the theater, searched, and
retrieved the hidden ingredient at the first test is shown in
Figure 1. Overall, children were very successful on these
three measures, and the groups did not differ. This indicates
that at the very least they made the association between the
doorbell and search behavior and were able to carry out
complete action sequences and retrieve the hidden ingredient.
Performance on these same measures 4 months later may be seen
in Figure 2. The two experienced groups were equally likely
to turn in the right direction, and did so significantly more
often than the control group (psc.OOl), and at a level
equivalent to their first test performance. Both experienced
groups also searched significantly more than the control group
(ps< .001)
,
although in this instance, search behavior of the
2-Week Repetition group was marginally greater than that of
the Same-Day Repetition group (p<.10) . Search for children in
both experienced groups was depressed from performance at
their first test (p<.01), however, and a marginally
significant Test x Group interaction (p<.10) suggested that
the performance of the Same-Day Repetition group declined
slightly more.
At the 4 -mo test, the experienced groups succeeded in
retrieving the ingredient on about 40% of the trials,
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differing significantly from the control group's performance
(E<. 001). None of the children in the control group ever
retrieved an ingredient. The 2-Week Repetition group
retrieved significantly more ingredients than both the Same-
Day Repetition group (pc. 05), and the control group (pc. 001),
while the Same-Day Repetition group performed only marginally
better than the control group (pc. 10). For both experienced
groups, the mean number of successful retrievals was
significantly reduced from their first test (pc. 001), and
there was a significant Test x Group interaction indicating a
greater decline in performance for the Same-Day Repetition
group (pc . 05)
.
We were interested not only in whether children could
encode small segments and behaviorally perform them, but in
whether they could encode hierarchical information such as the
goal and outcome of the event as well as animal and ingredient
names. A greater proportion of experienced children provided
information of any kind at the first test than at the second
(pc. 001), and when more cues were available (i.e., in the
experimental room rather than the reception room) (pc. 05).
Production of particular information categories was dependent
upon both test and room context, however. Of particular
interest was the difference in reporting event goals and
outcomes. The proportion of children providing the event goal
was sharply reduced from the first to the second test
(from
approximately 56% to 28%), while there was a slight increase
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in the proportion verbalizing the event outcome (roughly 25%
to 34%) . in addition to these children who verbalized the
outcome
,
at both the first and second test there were 4 or 5
children who indicated the spill behaviorally without
verbalizing it, that is, they reenacted it. It should be
noted that no control children ever provided the goal or
outcome of the event. Over 70% of the children named one or
more animals at both test times, and ingredients at the first
test; many less named an ingredient four months later.
As already mentioned, though more children provided
verbal information in the experimental room, the increase
differed somewhat for specific information categories. In
particular, there was a 3-fold increase in the proportion of
children providing the event outcome in the experimental room,
while the proportions of children providing the event goal
were not changed by the increase in contextual support. In
addition, almost twice as many children named animals in the
experimental room than in the reception room; in contrast, the
same number of children recalled an ingredient in either room.
The two experienced groups verbalized equally at the
their first test. Fewer children in the Same-Day Repetition
group provided verbalizations at the 4-mo test than children
in the 2-Week Repetition group (p<.005), however. These
findings parallel those reported previously for successful
retrievals
.
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We can therefore return to the 4 major questions posed
above. First, did 2-year olds enjoy the task and were they
able to participate? The answer is yes, and perhaps more
important is the finding that the event is not one that age-
matched controls are able to anticipate or pretend
spontaneously. Previous experience with the event,
represented in memory, underlies most of the target actions
and verbalizations.
Second, what did children remember of the event when the
event was repeated later the same day or 2 weeks later? After
a single experience, and regardless of the timing of their
first test, they remembered many components of the event.
Almost all children knew that a bell ringing in front of them
signalled that something would happen behind them. They knew
to approach and search, and the motor actions required for
retrieval. As mentioned earlier, these behaviors indicate that
at the very least, the children encoded and retained the kinds
of separate associations and action sequences seen in previous
studies of memory for simple unrelated motoric or imitative
play events (e.g., Bauer, Hertsgaard, & Dow, 1994; Fivush &
Hamond, 1989; Sheffield & Hudson, 1994). But they did more.
A majority of children recalled event animals and ingredients.
While these abilities may rely on limited associations similar
to those for actions, they indicate more than procedural
representation of the event. But they did still more. Some
children encoded or abstracted organizational components of
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the larger cohesive event, the goal and the outcome.
Approximately half the children reported that Teddy wanted to
"make silly soup", and almost that many indicated that Teddy
spilled the soup.
Third, what did the children remember after four months?
Although there was forgetting, memory was robust for some
components of the event. Children remembered to turn and
search, named animals, and indicated the outcome as readily as
at their first test, whether they experienced the repetition
on the same day as the first experience or two weeks later.
Children were less successful than at their first test in
retrieving the hidden ingredients, reporting the event goal,
and naming ingredients.
Fourth, was there a timing of repetition effect? Yes,
for some event components, but not for all. The timing of the
second event experience influenced retrieving ingredients and
reporting the event goal. Those children whose event
repetition was after 2 weeks remembered where the ingredients
were hidden and how to find them on more than half the trials;
children with a same-day repetition were able to do so on only
a quarter of the trials. Similarly, while almost 44% of the 2z.
Week Repetition group indicated that Teddy wanted to make
silly soup, less than 13% of the Same-Day Repetition group did
so.
These timing of event repetition effects are partially
consistent with previous research that found an additional
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event experience after two weeks facilitates later recall more
than repeated experience on the same day (Sheffield & Hudson,
1994) . However, because not all event components were equally
affected, a spaced-practice-advantage argument alone is not a
suffic ient explanation. These findings demonstrate that even
a same-day repetition may suffice for long-term memory for
certain components of an event.
Why might certain components of the event be affected by
the timing of the event repetition while others are not? One
possibility is that associations and action sequences rely
primarily on mechanisms that do not require much
interpretation or abstraction. The child might be learning
such simple contingencies as "when the bell rings, turn" and
"when an animal is there, go to it" and similarly be
establishing associations between puppets and animal names and
names with the physical ingredients. A few minutes thereafter
when the event repetition on the same day occurs, it might be
expected to strengthen fully consolidated traces of these
aspects of the event. Successful retrieval and reporting the
goal and outcome might also rely on these mechanisms to some
degree. The sight or touch of the animal might trigger
rotating the turntable, and the sight of the ingredient-
related prop might trigger the lifting action required to
obtain the concealed item. Similarly, a simple direct verbal
association between Teddy's name and "silly soup" might have
been established, and Teddy's nose in the mixing bowl might
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cue the spill. Certainly, the excellent performance at the
same-day repetition suggests that such associations or
contingencies were remembered at least for brief periods.
Why then was the repetition after two weeks especially
helpful in enabling children to retrieve concealed ingredients
and report goals after 4 months? It is likely that due to
forgetting, children at the event repetition after 2 weeks
held in memory fewer intact traces of the simple direct
associations that supported performance of children tested the
same day. Consequently, they may have needed additional
probes at their first test which may have affected their
representations of the event. Instead of representing the
event in terms of direct associations, these children perhaps
remembered the event as a game involving their finding hidden
ingredients for soup. This more general representation, in
addition to the cue-response contingencies, was strengthened
by the event repetition. The children's performance at 4
months then would benefit from such an abstracted
representation, at least according to Brainerd (Brainerd &
Reyna, 1990)
,
who argues that such abstracted or fuzzy
representations are more resistent to forgetting than verbatim
traces of specific perceptual cue contingencies.
Thus, although performances of the two experienced groups
at their first test appeared equivalent, they may have been
based on qualitatively different event representations. At the
4-month test, the learned associations between cues and
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actions or words were probably still available to a limited
extent for both groups. Myers, Perris, and Speaker (1994)
demonstrated the durability and effectiveness of
representations based on such implicit processes. Associative
traces then, were most likely used to recall some of the
appropriate behaviors or verbalizations, especially in the
presence of the multiple context cues in the experimental
room. However, representations of a more abstract nature or
interpretation seemed to be necessary for successful recall of
the goal and hidden ingredient location. Only children
reexperiencing the event after two weeks seemed to have
utilized such processes to any great extent. It appears then
that the delay before an event repetition will be facilitative
to long-term memory of a complex event to the degree that
abstracted understanding underlies recall.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CURRENT STUDY
Introduction
From the work so far, we know that our event is one in
which 2-year-old children are capable of participating, and
one they also appear to enjoy. Also, prior experience with
the event seems to be necessary. That is, the event is not
one that an age-matched control group is able to anticipate or
pretend spontaneously. It is now possible to move forward to
ask more precise questions about memory for a complex event at
2 years of age.
In everyday life, we rarely have the opportunity to
reexperience or reenact an event in its totality. Rather, it
is often just a stimulus or two which we encounter that
triggers a memory, reminding us of an event. One issue to be
addressed here is how exposure to specific stimuli rather than
total event repetitions affects memory performance. That is,
does a reminder have a facilitative effect on 2-year olds'
memories for events? Or can such facilitation be achieved
only by event repetition? Rovee-Collier ' s work with young
infants would suggest that a reactivation treatment in context
should increase the accessibility of the memory for the event
and enhance performance.
In addition to asking whether 2-year olds can benefit
from a reminder, we can ask further whether certain reminders
are more effective than others in enhancing performance.
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Under investigation here are three reminders: an action
reminder, an outcome reminder, and a reminiscence reminder.
Young children tend to remember primarily the motor
activity of events, especially when they perform it (e.g.
,
Jones, Swift, & Johnson, 1988) . Additionally, providing an
action context at the time of test has been found to
facilitate recall in 5-year-old children (Smith, Ratner, &
Hobart, 1987). Thus, given this saliency of action to young
children, a central action in the event should be an effective
reminder.
Outcomes, probably due to their goal-related nature, have
been found to be extremely influential on recall of older
children and adults. In contrast, for toddlers and pre-
schoolers, Ratner and Foley (1994) have reported that outcomes
tend to be of little influence. Therefore, providing an
outcome reminder may do very little to enhance memory recall
in our 2 -year olds. However, two points might temper this
negative prediction. First, it may be that sensitivity to
outcomes has not been seen in young children because of the
mode of test. Perhaps toddlers and preschoolers are not able
to verbalize their knowledge of the outcome, but could
behaviorally indicate their awareness. Second, it is possible
that the outcome of our event may contain an affective quality
which may increase its saliency. The first study with this
event found that the spill elicited concern from the subjects
and quick action to avoid or remedy the situation. It appears
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that at 2 years spilling is seen as something bad, perhaps
usually followed by a reprimand. Although we assure the
children that Teddy is not bad for spilling the soup, perhaps
the emotional response will be triggered by the outcome
reminder and render it effective.
The third type of reminder considered here is one of
reminiscing, i.e., verbal discussion of components of the
event. As discussed previously, much of the work exploring
reminiscing has methodological problems. Often parents are
asked to pick an event or multiple events to discuss with
their child of which there may or may not be any external
permanent record. Thus, it is assumed that the parent's
memory is accurate. In such studies, parents are usually
given very vague instructions on how to conduct the
reminiscence. Consequently, if an event is discussed multiple
times, often it is not discussed in the same manner, resulting
in little consistency of content or order over time.
Moreover, a number of studies have examined memory for many
events at once. For example, Hudson (1993) asked mothers to
reminisce about four events with their 2-year-old children
once a week for four weeks. Subjects were questioned 2 weeks
later by an experimenter not only about these four events, but
about an additional four events not previously discussed.
Eight events are a lot to discuss at one sitting. It should
be noted that the subjects were also discussing different
events from one another. Additional research (e.g., Fivush,
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Hamond, Harsch, Singer, & Wolf, 1991) has found that when
mothers have experienced the event with their child, and then
reminisce with them about it, they are often looking for
specific answers from the child and do not allow the child to
narrate the experience in their own way.
To address these problems of variability in style and
amounts of events and reminiscences, here the effect of
reminiscence is investigated in a much more standardized way.
All participants receiving a reminiscence reminder experienced
the same event and reminisced about it with an adult who did
not participate in the event with them. A standard script for
discussing the event was followed. Furthermore, children
reminisced about some of the components of the event with
accompanying pictures, reminisced about some components
without pictures, and did not reminisce at all about other
components. This allowed for comparison to see if
reminiscence conducted with accompanying pictures serves as a
stronger reminder of the event and/or its components than
reminiscence alone. Often the goal of previous reminiscence
research has been to determine if reminiscing has a
facilitative effect on later verbal recall or reporting of an
event; behavioral measures of memory have not been fully
explored. Here the effectiveness of reminiscing on both
verbal reports and behavioral indices of memory was assessed.
It may be that reminiscing will prove to be more effective as
a reminder once such other indices are included.
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A third question of primary interest in this study is the
extent or range of reminding effects. Does the reminder
reactivate a general memory for the event or reactivate only
the specific aspect directly related to the reminder itself?
For example, will the outcome reminder help the child to
remember ingredients or how to retrieve them which might
indicate a general activation of the event memory? Or will it
only aid in recall of the spill itself? Similarly with
reminiscence, does reminiscence reactivate a general memory
for the event or reactivate only the specific aspects directly
related to the components involved in the reminiscence?
An issue related to the range of reminding effects is
what the range of behaviors induced by the reminder tells us
about the memory mechanisms involved. To illustrate this
point, consider the action reminder, which involves
presentation of the event turntable. It is possible that such
a reminder may facilitate performance in finding the hidden
ingredients only for those children who interact directly with
it during the reminder treatment, that is, those children who
turn it and lift the lid to the compartment. If such is the
case, it would be unfounded to conclude anything greater than
procedural memory is evidenced. However, if it is the case
that even children who only glance at the reminder and do
not
engage in reenactment, perform better than their peers
who do
not receive it, then we might be able to conclude
that
something beyond a procedural memory mechanism is
operating.
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Method
Participants
Forty-two children approximately 28 months of age at the
time of the first session were the participants. The mean age
was 27 months 2 6 days, and the range was 2 6 months 12 days to
29 months 16 days. Children were recruited from birth records
in the Developmental Psychology files by letters and telephone
calls to parents, and scheduled for two appointments.
Additional children participated but were not included in the
final sample because of failure to complete training (n=2)
,
failure to return for the long-term assessment (n=4) , or
illness during the return visit (n=l)
.
Design
All sessions were conducted at the University. Sessions
1 and 2 were separated by 2 months. This interval was
selected for several reasons. First, in the previous work,
performance 4 months after training was certainly not optimal,
especially for those subjects whose event repetition was on
the same day as training. Second, the primary concern here
was evaluation of reminder effects, not the duration of long-
term memory. Children's memories for the event should be
far
from perfect at two months, allowing us to test the
reminder
effects. Children were randomly assigned to one of
four
reminder conditions, counterbalancing sex as much as
possible.
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The groups and the number of children in each are designated
below.
Action reminder group . The reminder given on the day of
Session 2 involved the event search action (the empty
turntable) (n=ll)
.
Outcome reminder group . A reminder of the event outcome
(animal host and empty bowl) was used during Session 2 (n=10)
.
Reminiscence group . The reminder involved structured
reminiscing about the event. The target event was broken down
into 6 components (see Table 1) . For each subject assigned to
this condition, 2 components were discussed with pictures, 2
discussed without pictures, and 2 not discussed at all. In
order to balance as much as possible the occurrence of each
question, and discussion with and without pictures, a set of
eight orders was generated (see Table 2) (n=ll)
.
No reminder group . Children in this group received no
reminder of the target event on the day of Session 2, rather
they were presented with a neutral stimulus (plastic hanger
display) (n=10)
.
Apparatus
Reception room environment . The reception room had a
Fisher-Price farm set arranged on the rug in the center of
the
sitting area. The farm was the medium through which
the
subject and experimenter developed rapport. An audiotape
recorder was on a desk adjacent to the play area to record
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Table 1
Elements of Reminiscence Script
Component Discussed Corresponding Picture
(1) Play with Animal Host
Q: Who did you play with?
A: You played with Teddy.
(2) Cooking goal
Q: What did you make?
A: You made silly soup.
(3) Visiting animals
Q: Who came to visit when the
bell rang?
A: Teddy's friends, like the
giraffe.
(4) Finding ingredients
Q: How did you find the
things (ingredients)?
A: You turned the table and
found them under.
Teddy Bear
Kitchen stove, table
with bowl and spoon
Giraffe puppet
Turntable at Puppet
Theater
(5) Ingredients Soap in bowl
Q: What things did you find and
put in the soup?
A: You put soap in the soup.
(6) Outcome Teddy with spilled
Q: Why did you stop playing? soup
A: Teddy spilled the soup.
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Table 2
Distribution and Order of Reminiscence Questions
Question Number
Order 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 E D P E D P
2 E P D P E D
3 E D P D P E
4 P E D E P D
5 D E P D E P
6 P E D P D E
7 P D E P E D
8 D P E D P E
Abbreviation Key:
E=Eliminated (question not posed)
P=Pictured (question posed with accompanying picture)
D=Discussed (question posed without accompanying picture)
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portions of both sessions. A digital timer was situated on
the wall above the desk to time portions of both sessions.
Experimental room environment . An experimental room
(360x540cm) was arranged to include a play kitchen area at one
end and a puppet theater at the other. The kitchen area
included the following: a brightly colored cardboard play
stove ( 118x69x3 lcm) ; a child-sized table (77x51cm) equipped
with a doorbell button, and on which was a plastic mixing bowl
containing pieces of puffed rice and dried flowers and spoon;
3 child-sized chairs on one of which a large yellow and purple
Teddy Bear was seated; and a video camera in the corner. The
doorbell sound emanated from behind the stove. A small box
was hidden at the feet of the experimenter containing
duplicate ingredients for use during Session 2. A chair for
the parent was placed at a distance (90cm) from the table and
off to the side. The puppet theater (123x184x84cm) in the
rear of the room had a turntable (4 9cm diameter) on its ledge.
The turntable was divided into two sections such that one side
was concealed when the other was exposed. On one side was a
surface on which the puppets were displayed. On the other
side was a compartment in which the ingredients were hidden.
All the surface area of the turntable was covered in green
felt. Hidden behind the theater were the 6 puppets to be
displayed one at a time. The plush hand puppets (approx. 30
cm in height) were each mounted on a wooden paddle which
allowed for easier and quieter exposure. Puppets included the
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following animals: natural-toned giraffe and raccoon, cream-
colored stylized ("Snuggles") bear, green frog, white monkey,
and tan fox. The ingredients, small for easy handling by a
child, and their corresponding prop holders included the
following: a plastic wrapped travel size bar of Ivory soap
and plastic toy tub; white plastic egg and wicker nest; red-
brown rawhide dog-bone and cardboard doghouse; tan rawhide
potato chip and individual serving potato chip bag; black
rubber tire and plastic toy truck; waxed banana and miniature
artificial tree. An olfactory cue was present throughout the
sessions, a scent delivered by warming a unique mixture of
potpourri in the room in a concealed electric pot.
Reminiscence photo album . A small photo album (approx.
15x15cm) containing 7 pages, 3 pages with pictures and
questions, 2 with questions only, and 2 blank pages was
utilized for some children in Session 2. The arrangement of
pages was prepared before the session for each individual
child dependent upon order assignment (see Table 2). The
pictures depicting specific animals or ingredients were those
of stimuli involved in the first training and testing trial,
i.e., giraffe, soap.
Testing Procedures
Children were trained and tested individually by a female
experimenter. A second experimenter acted as the puppeteer,
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out of sight during the activities in the experimental room.
Different protocols were followed for Sessions 1 and 2.
Session 1 . All children and their parents were greeted
in the reception room by the experimenter. Children were
encouraged to play with the farm, as the experimenter
explained the procedure to the parent and obtained written
consent to proceed (see Appendix A for Consent Form) . After
the child and experimenter developed a rapport, the
experimenter announced that it was time to go to the other
room to play with Teddy, and invited the child and parent to
accompany her. Session 1 contained two parts — training and
an immediate test.
Training : In the experimental room, the child was
told that Teddy wanted to play with her/him and that he wanted
the child to help him make his favorite silly soup (which he
had started) . The experimenter encouraged the child to smell
or sniff the puffed rice and dried flowers in the bowl.
Once the child was seated across from the experimenter
with his/her back to the theater and the experimenter believed
that the child was engaged in the task, the experimenter in a
nonobvious manner pressed the button on the table to activate
the doorbell. At this time, the puppeteer quietly placed the
appropriate animal through the curtain on one side of the
turntable. After the sound, the experimenter said
(while
pointing towards the puppet theater), "Look — it's Teddy's
friend the i What has he brought for the silly soup?
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Let's go find it." As the child and the experimenter went to
the puppet theater, the experimenter said "the (animal)
brought (ingredient)." The puppeteer placed the
ingredient in the hidden compartment and the prop holder on
the other side of the turntable before the experimenter turned
the turntable and said, "Is it hiding in his
(holder)?" For example, "The giraffe brought soap . Is it
hiding in his tub? No — Let's look." The child was then
shown how to open the hidden compartment. "Here's the soap —
under the tub." Once the item was found, the child carried it
back to the table. The experimenter named the ingredient
again and claimed it indeed to be a silly thing for soup
(e.g., "A tire ! What a silly thing to put in soup!") The
child put the item in the bowl and stirred; the experimenter
held the bowl securely. The experimenter said in an animated
manner, "Let's smell. That smells good!" and encouraged the
child to smell. Once the experimenter judged the time to be
right to move on, she again in a nonobvious manner pressed the
button to sound the doorbell and the same procedure was
repeated with the next animal puppet. This sequence continued
until all 6 animals were presented. The animals (with their
corresponding ingredients and prop holders) were presented in
the following (randomly generated) standard order: giraffe
(soap/tub)
,
raccoon (egg/nest) , bear (dog bone/dog house)
,
frog (potato chip/potato chip bag), monkey (tire/truck), fox
(banana/tree) . On the second and subsequent trials, the child
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was encouraged to rotate the turntable and retrieve the
ingredient on his or her own.
After the sixth ingredient was placed in the bowl and the
soup stirred, the session ended by the experimenter saying
"Teddy wants to smell the soup" and as Teddy did so, he
knocked over the bowl, spilling its contents on the floor to
the side of the table. As the spill occurred, the experimenter
said "Oops! Teddy spilled the silly soup. What a silly bear!
We can't play anymore. We'll go back to the other room while
Teddy cleans up his mess!" The experimenter, child, and
parent then left the experimental room.
Immediate test : Once back in the reception room,
the experimenter set the timer and played with the child for
three minutes. The puppeteer re-assembled the experimental
room and resumed her concealed position during this interval.
When the timer sounded, the experimenter turned on the
audiotape recorder in a nonobvious fashion, and asked "When we
played in the other room, what did we do?" There were several
possible levels of response and procedures varied somewhat
depending on the response. If the child said "we played" but
went no further, the experimenter repeated: "What did we do?"
If the child said "made soup", the experimenter agreed
and
asked: "What did we put in the soup?" If the child
provided
one or more ingredients, the experimenter gave
general
approval, but did not correct, or repeat (e.g., "okay"
or
"that'd be good", or "good guess"). When the child
stopped
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naming things, the experimenter asked "Anything else?" If the
child provided no answer to the first or second open-ended
query, the experimenter said: "We played with Teddy. What does
Teddy like to do?" If the child then provided "soup", the
experimenter continued as described above. If the child
reported that Teddy spilled the soup, or any variety of that,
the experimenter gave general approval and then moved to the
query about what was in the soup. If the child reported that
we "played with Teddy", or some vague generalization of that
sort, the experimenter asked again "what did Teddy like to
do?" and followed as above as appropriate. If the child
reported a more specific procedure such as "Teddy's friends
brought stuff for the soup", the experimenter asked, "Who were
Teddy's friends?" and if any animals were named, asked for
each one, "What did bring for the soup?" If no animal
names were provided by the child, the experimenter went on to
query about what was in the soup.
When the questioning was complete, the experimenter
invited the child and parent to go with her: "Let's go play
with Teddy again, and see what happens...." In the
experimental room, the child was seated as before in the chair
across from the experimenter and reintroduced to Teddy. If
the child provided the goal of making soup in the reception
room, the experimenter said "Teddy wants you to help him
make
his silly soup just as you said in the other room." If the
child did not provide the goal, the experimenter
told the
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child that Teddy wanted to play with her/him and asked "what
does he want to do?" If the child did not report "make soup,"
the experimenter said that Teddy wants him/her to help him
make his favorite silly soup (which he has started)
. The
experimenter encouraged the child to smell or sniff.
Once the experimenter believed that the child was engaged
in the task, the experimenter in a nonobvious manner pressed
the button on the table for the doorbell. After the sound was
heard, the experimenter waited approximately 5 seconds and
said "What was that?" There were several possible levels of
response and procedures varied somewhat depending on the
response. If the child turned and moved toward the puppet
theater, the experimenter, accompanying him/her, asked "Who's
coming?" (The puppeteer upon hearing this displayed the
animal.) If the child did not name the animal, the
experimenter said "It's Teddy's friend the " and "What
did the bring for the silly soup?" If the child did
not answer, the experimenter said "The brought .
Where is it?" If the child turned the turntable and retrieved
the ingredient, the experimenter provided reinforcement by
saying "You found the ! It was under the " and
suggested that it be added to the soup, and continued the
routine by smelling, etc. If the child did not turn the
turntable, the experimenter did so. If the child still did
not retrieve the ingredient, the experimenter lifted the
lid
to expose it.
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If the child did not turn toward the puppet theater but
just answered something such as "bell" or did not answer,
after 5 seconds the experimenter said "It's Teddy's friend the
! " and paused to see if the child turned. (The
puppeteer upon hearing this displayed the animal.) If the
child did not turn, the experimenter said, "Look! What has he
brought for the silly soup? Let's go find it." The child and
the experimenter went to the puppet theater and the procedure
followed as above. In this immediate test procedure, the
experimenter always went with the child to the theater.
Once the ingredient was brought back to the table, the
experimenter named it and claimed it indeed to be a silly
thing for soup as during initial training. The child put the
ingredient in the bowl and stirred; the experimenter held the
bowl securely. The experimenter said in an animated manner,
"Let's smell. That smells good!" and encouraged the child to
smell. Once the experimenter judged the time to be right to
move on, she again in a nonobvious manner pressed the button
to sound the doorbell and the same procedure was repeated with
the next puppet. This sequence continued until all 6 animals
were presented in the same order as during training.
After the sixth ingredient was placed in the bowl and the
soup stirred and smelled, the experimenter asked "What does
Teddy want to do now?" If the child did not answer,
the
experimenter asked the child to show her what happens. If
the
child still did not respond, the experimenter said,
"Teddy
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wants to smell the soup. What happens when he smells it?" If
the child did not answer, the experimenter again asked the
child to show her what happens. After 5 seconds, if the child
did not make Teddy spill the soup, the experimenter had Teddy
knock over the bowl, spilling its contents onto the floor to
the side of the table. As the spill occurred, the
experimenter said "Oops! Teddy spilled the silly soup. What
a silly bear! We can't play anymore. We'll go back to the
other room while Teddy cleans up his mess!" The experimenter,
child, and parent then left the experimental room.
Once back in the reception room, the child and parent
were thanked and the child was given a book for playing with
Teddy. At this time, a two-month return visit was scheduled.
Parents were asked to not raise discussion of the event with
the their child during the intervening time, and instructed
that if their child brought up the subject to be generally
responsive, but not correct or repeat items or provide further
information themselves. The entire session lasted
approximately 30 minutes.
Session 2 . This session, occurred approximately 2 months
after the first (M=8 weeks 6 days; range=7 weeks 5 days to 12
weeks 6 days) , and contained two parts a reminder treatment
and the long-term memory test.
Reminder treatment : Upon arrival of child and
parent, the experimenter set the timer for 30 minutes.
As in
Session 1, the child was encouraged to play with
the farm
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while the parent read and signed the consent form (see
Appendix B) . After completing the consent form, the parent
was asked to answer a questionnaire (see Appendix C) . One
purpose of this questionnaire was to monitor whether the
target event had been discussed outside the controlled
sessions. Additionally, the questionnaire allowed systematic
recording of parents' memory for the event. The reminder
treatment took place while the parent completed the
questionnaire. As previously described, there were 4 reminder
conditions. For the Outcome . Action Reminder , and No Reminder
groups, the puppeteer came into the room with the appropriate
stimulus and placed it on the coffee table in the sitting
area. The experimenter drew the child's attention to the
stimulus by calling his or her name and saying "Look what
brought in!" The subject was allowed to interact with it
for approximately 3 minutes. The puppeteer sat at the desk
and silently recorded the child's interactions and
verbalizations during this period (see Appendix D for scoring
form) . If the child provided any verbal report of the event
experience while interacting with the stimulus, the
experimenter provided general acquiescence if the child
directed the comments to her, but did not correct or repeat
any information nor probe the subject for additional
information. The experimenter did not otherwise directly
interact with the child during this period. When the
three
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minutes had elapsed, the puppeteer left, taking the stimulus
away with her.
For the Reminiscence Group, the puppeteer came into the
room with the photo album. She introduced herself to the
child and invited the child to the table to look at her
pictures. She turned on the audiotape recorder before she and
the child sat at the table with their backs to the sitting
area and farm. The puppeteer turned to the first page of the
photo album which pictured the reception room and farm set,
and asked "When you came here the last time, what did you do?"
The puppeteer gave general approval to, but did not correct or
repeat anything the child said, and once the child finished
his or her report, the puppeteer turned the page and asked the
next question, which depended on the child's particular
assignment. The questions relating to the six components were
outlined previously in Table 1 and are reiterated below. The
puppeteer provided the answers noted in parentheses after the
questions regardless of how the child answered:
(1) "Who did you play with?" (You played with Teddy.)
(2) "What did you make?" (You made silly soup.)
(3) "Who came to visit when the bell rang?" (Teddy s
friends, like the giraffe.)
(4) "How did you find the things (ingredients)?" (You
turned the table and found them under.)
(5) "What things did you find and put in the
soup? (You
put soap in the soup.)
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(Teddy spilled the(6) "Why did you stop playing?"
soup.
)
Our prior work suggested that children are not voluble in
providing free recall information in this event, and other
research literature indicates that young children's narrative
recall is primarily in response to specific questions from
their conversational partner. Therefore, no serious problems
in keeping to the conversational protocol were expected and
none arose.
For all groups, after the presentation of the reminder,
the experimenter engaged the child in free play for the
remaining time before test. A similar interval (30 min)
between reminder and test was effective in the Perris et al.
study. During the free play period, a box of toys was
available to the child if interest in the farm waned. Objects
in the box included a selection of wooden blocks, magnetic
letters
,
plastic play telephone, plastic interlocking building
stars, and markers and paper.
Long-term test : The procedure was the same for all
participants regardless of reminder condition. Once the timer
rang, the experimenter unobtrusively turned on the audiotape
recorder, and introduced the following verbal routine: "When
you were here before you played in the other room. What
did
you do?" As in the immediate test in Session 1,
there were
several possible levels of response, and procedures
varied
somewhat depending on the response. If the child
said "yes"
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but went no further
,
the experimenter repeated: "What did you
do?" If the child said "made soup", the experimenter agreed,
and asked: "What did you put in the soup?" If the child
provided one or more ingredients, the experimenter gave
general approval, but did not correct, or repeat (e.g., "okay"
or "that'd be good", or "good guess") . When the child stopped
naming things, the experimenter asked "Anything else?" If the
child provided no answer to the first or second open-ended
query, the experimenter said: "You played with Teddy. What
does Teddy like to do?" If the child then provided "soup",
the experimenter continued as described above. If the child
reported that Teddy spilled the soup, or any variety of that,
the experimenter agreed, and then moved to the query about
what was in the soup. If the child reported that we "played
with Teddy", or some vague generalization of that sort, the
experimenter asked again "what did Teddy like to do?" and
followed as above as appropriate. If the child reported a
more specific procedure such as "Teddy's friends brought stuff
for the soup", the experimenter asked, "Who were Teddy's
friends?" and if any animals were named, asked for each one,
"What did the bring for the soup?" If no animal names
were provided by the child, the experimenter queried about
what was in the soup.
When the questioning was complete, the experimenter
invited the child and parent to go with her: "Let's go play
with Teddy again, and see what happens...." In the
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experimental room, the child was seated as before in the chair
across from the experimenter and reintroduced to Teddy. If
the child provided the goal of making soup in the reception
room, the experimenter said "Teddy wants you to help him make
his silly soup just as you said in the other room." If the
child did not provide the goal, the experimenter told the
child that Teddy wanted to play with her/him and asked "what
do you think he wants to do?" If the child did not report
"make soup," the experimenter said that Teddy wants him/her to
help him make his favorite silly soup (which he has started) .
The experimenter encouraged the child to smell or sniff.
Once the experimenter believed that the child was engaged
in the task, the experimenter in a nonobvious manner pressed
the button on the table for the doorbell. After the sound was
heard, the experimenter waited approximately 5 seconds and
said "What was that?" There were several possible levels of
response and procedures varied somewhat depending on the
response. At this long-term test, the experimenter remained
seated. ("Yes!" was the cue word for the puppeteer to display
the puppet.
)
If the child turned and moved toward the puppet theater,
the experimenter said "Yes! Who's coming?" If the child did
not name the animal, the experimenter said "It's Teddy's
friend the " and "What did the bring for the
silly soup?" If the child did not answer, the experimenter
said "The brought . Where is it?" If the
child
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turned the turntable and retrieved the item, the experimenter
provided reinforcement by saying "You found the !" and
suggested that it be added to the soup, and continued the
routine. If the child did not turn the turntable, the
experimenter asked "Is the hiding? Can you find it?"
If after searching, the child was unable to find the
ingredient, the experimenter announced "That's okay. We'll
use mine" (surreptitiously producing the item from the box at
her feet) and continued the routine.
If the child turned but did not move toward the puppet
theater, the experimenter said "Yes! Who's coming?" If the
child did not name the animal, the experimenter said "It's
Teddy's friend the " and "What did the bring for
the silly soup?" If the child did not answer, the
experimenter said "The brought " and after a 5
sec delay if the child did not approach the theater to search,
presented the appropriate ingredient from the box at her feet
("Here it is") and continued the routine.
If the child did not turn toward the puppet theater but
just answered something such as "bell" or did not answer,
after 5 seconds the experimenter said "It's Teddy's friend the
." If the child turned towards the puppet theater at
this point, the experimenter said "Yes! Here he comes." The
procedure then followed as above, depending upon whether the
child moved towards the theater or not. If the child did
not
turn, after 5 more seconds the experimenter asked, "What
did
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Then after 5 secondsthe bring for the silly soup?"
the experimenter declared that "The brought for
the soup" and after a 5 sec delay produced the appropriate
ingredient from the box at her feet ("Here it is") and
continued the routine.
Once the ingredient was displayed, the experimenter named
it and claimed it indeed to be a silly thing for soup (e.g.,
"He brought a tire ! What a silly thing to put in soup!") The
child put the item in the bowl and stirred; the experimenter
held the bowl securely. The experimenter said in an animated
manner, "Let's smell. That smells good!" and encouraged the
child to smell. Once the experimenter judged the time to be
right to move on, she again in a nonobvious manner pressed the
button to sound the doorbell and the same procedure was
repeated with the next animal. This sequence continued until
all 6 animals were presented in the same order as during
Session 1. Throughout this time, the experimenter did not
draw attention to the puppet theater unless the child
initiated it.
After the sixth ingredient was placed in the bowl and the
soup stirred and smelled, the experimenter asked "What does
Teddy want to do now?" If the child did not answer or
answered incorrectly, the experimenter asked "Can you show me
what Teddy wants to do now?" If the child did not indicate
that Teddy smells or spills the soup, the experimenter
said
"Teddy wants to smell the soup. What happens when he
smells
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After the childthe soup? Can you show me what happens?"
answered or after 5 seconds, Teddy knocked over the bowl,
spilling its contents onto the floor to the side of the table
farthest from the door. As the spill occurred, the
experimenter said "Oops! Teddy spilled the silly soup. What
a silly bear! We can't play anymore. We'll go back to the
other room while Teddy cleans up his mess!"
Session 2 concluded in the same manner as Session 1, with
a prize and thanks. In addition, a certificate of
participation was given to all subjects at this long-term
test.
Scoring, Reliability, and Statistical Procedures
Multiple dependent measures were scored for each
participant by two undergraduate research assistants blind to
group assignment, and percentage agreement scores were
calculated for each measure to check reliability (see Appendix
E for scoring packet). Children's verbal responses to
questions regarding the event were tape recorded in both the
reception and experimental rooms and transcribed. Each trial
of the routine proper was scored separately, and performance
was then tallied over the 6 trials. For each trial, the
behaviors scored included the following: Does the child
orient to the theater?; does s/he name an animal?; does s/he
approach the theater?; does s/he engage in search behavior; is
s/he successful in retrieval of the ingredient, and if so, how
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long does it take for retrieval? ; does s/he name an
ingredient? Memory for the concluding episode of the event
(the spill) was probed with both verbal and behavioral
measures. Verbal indices included reporting Teddy's desire to
smell the soup or that he will spill it and also indications
of the wish to prevent the spill. Behavioral indices included
reenactment of Teddy smelling or spilling the soup and also
anticipatory prevention of the spill.
Percentage agreement was 100% on all but latency
measures. Latency times were averaged for the 2 scorers
provided that the difference did not exceed 2 sec. A third
scorer resolved discrepancies exceeding 2 sec.
In general, statistical tests and contrasts were carried
out first among all groups. Considering the small samples and
subject variability might obscure differences among the
reminder groups, the reminder groups were collapsed if group
differences were not significant at the .25 alpha level.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Trial Performance
Immediate Test
For each participant, the number of trials that the child
turned towards the theater, searched for the hidden
ingredient, retrieved the ingredient, and named animals and
ingredients were recorded. A summary of the group means (and
standard deviations) on these trial measures can be seen in
Table 3. All children turned and searched on every trial.
Children in the Outcome and No Reminder groups also retrieved
on every trial. There were a few children in both the Action
and Reminiscence groups who did not retrieve on one trial,
primarily the first. In general, however, children performed
very well and analyses of variance with group as a factor
indicated no significant differences on these measures.
Children named animals on approximately 2 of the 6 trials.
They tended to name ingredients on still fewer trials,
averaging less than 1. Again for these two measures, analyses
of variance indicated no significant group differences.
2
-Mo Test
The same measures recorded at the immediate test were
also recorded at the 2 -mo long-term test. A summary of the
group means (and standard deviations) on these trial measures
can be seen in Table 4. Children in all groups but the
Action
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Table 3
Group Means for Number of Trials
on which Behaviors Occurred
(Immediate Test)
Named
Grouo Turned Searched Retrieved Animal
Action 6.00
(0.00)
6.00
(0.00)
5.91
(0.30)
1.73
(1.49)
Outcome 6.00
(0.00)
6.00
(0.00)
6.00
(0.00)
1.50
(1.51)
Reminiscence 6.00
(0.00)
6.00
(0.00)
5.73
(0.47)
2.36
(2.42)
No Reminder 6.00
(0.00)
6.00
(0.00)
6.00
(0.00)
2.00
(1.89)
Note : Standard deviations in parentheses.
Named
Inured.
0.73
(1.27)
0.80
(1.23)
0.36
(0.51)
0.90
( 1 . 10 )
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Table 4
Group Means for Number of Trials
on which Behaviors Occurred
(2-Mo Test)
Named
Grouo Turned Searched Retrieved Animal
Action 5.55
(1.51)
3.82
(2.86)
3.36
(3.04)
2.91
(1.87)
Outcome 6.00
(0.00)
5.80
(0.63)
4 .30
(2.58)
3.10
(1.60)
Reminiscence 6.00
(0.00)
4.09
(2.51)
3.18
(2.79)
3.91
(1.76)
No Reminder 6.00
(0.00)
4.50
(2.46)
3 . 00
(3.16)
2.50
(1.65)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Named
Inqred.
0.64
( 1 . 21 )
1.90
(1.91)
1.46
(1.97)
0.60
(0.70)
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group turned on every trial. Children in the Action group
searched on the fewest trials as well, while children in the
Outcome group searched on the most trials. Successful
retrieval did not occur with every search. The No Reminder
group retrieved the fewest ingredients and the Outcome group
retrieved the most. On average, children named animals on
about 3 trials. As on the immediate test, children tended to
name ingredients on fewer trials than they named animals,
averaging about one. For all five of these measures, analyses
of variance indicated no significant group differences.
Reminder groups did not differ significantly from the No
Reminder group on these measures in planned separate
contrasts
.
In addition to these five measures, at the 2-mo test the
latency from the sound of the doorbell to each successful
retrieval was also recorded. There were 14 children who never
successfully retrieved an ingredient. These children were
from all groups (4 from Action . 2 from Outcome , 3 from
Reminiscence . and 5 from the No Reminder qroup) , and a chi-
square analysis indicated no difference in this pattern of not
responding among groups. In addition, due to camera failure
one child's test was not recorded, and although the child
retrieved on all 6 trials, latencies could not be established.
The data of these 15 children were eliminated from the
analyses conducted on the latency to first successful re-
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trieval and the average latency to retrieval. Thus, 27
children contributed data.
The mean latencies (in s) to first successful retrieval
(and standard deviations) for the groups can be seen in Table
5. The Action group took the most time for their first
successful retrieval. Indeed, the children in this group took
almost 10s longer than the children in the other 3 groups
combined. However, neither the overall group effect nor the
results of planned contrasts between reminder groups were
significant.
As one would expect, the average of the latencies over
all successful retrievals was shorter than the latency to
first successful response. The average latencies for the
groups can also be seen in Table 5. Children in the Action
group also took longer overall to find the hidden ingredients;
again, their average latency was almost 10s longer than the
mean of the other 3 groups. However, as with the measure of
latency to first successful retrieval, there was no overall
group effect, nor did planned contrasts indicate significant
group differences.
Performance Over Time and Measure
To examine trial performance over time and measures, an
analysis of variance was carried out on the means with 1
between (group) and 2 within (test time and measure) factors.
The analysis indicated no main effect of group or test time.
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Table 5
Group Mean Latencies (in s)
to Successful Retrievals at the 2-Mo Test
Group
Latency to First
Successful Retrieval
Average Latency
fall trials}
Action 40.57 32.65
(n=7) (30.84) (20.52)
Outcome 32.57 22.72
(n=8) (25.22) (11.71)
Reminiscence 35.59 27.07
(n=7) (13.97) (6.87)
No Reminder 27 .33 23 . 10
(n=5) (5.78) (5.19)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
However, not surprisingly, a main effect of measure was
indicated (F (2 , 76) =81 . 98
,
p<.001). Children's behavioral
indices of memory were stronger than their verbal indices.
While children overall turned, searched and retrieved on more
than 75% of the trials, they provided animals on about 40%,
and ingredients on less than 20% of the trials.
Figure 3 shows the mean number of trials on which each
measure was performed at the two test times. Although as
already mentioned, there was no overall effect of test time,
performance on particular measures was dependent upon time of
test (F (2 , 76) =77 . 96
,
p<.001) . While the mean number of trials
children turned remained about the same, there was a
significant 25% decrease in search behavior (F(l,41)=16.56,
p<.001) and a significant 40% decrease in the number of
successful retrievals (F ( 1 , 41) =32 . 49 , p<.001). Performance on
both verbal measures, naming animals and ingredients, actually
increased from the immediate to the long-term test,
significantly for animals (F ( 1 , 41) =14 . 82 , p<.001) , but not for
ingredients
.
Performance Compared to First Study Data
Separate contrasts were carried out for each reminder
group against the 4 -mo performance of the Same-Day Repetition
group from the first study. No significant group effects were
found for the number of trials on which children turned
towards the theater or searched. While all current study
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groups retrieved on more trials than the earlier group, for
only the Outcome group was the difference significant
(F ( 1 , 53) =6 . 71
,
p< . 01) . Only the Reminiscence group named
animals on more trials (F ( 1 , 53 ) =5 . 40 , p<.05). This group, as
well as the Outcome group, also named ingredients on more
trials (F ( 1 , 53 ) =5 . 03 , p<.05 and F ( 1 , 53 ) =8 . 92 , p<.01,
respectively)
. Finally, no group differed from the earlier
group on either latency measure.
Verbal Reporting in the Two Room Contexts
In order to examine the pattern of verbal report for
specific components of the event, four categories of
information were defined: goal, outcome, animal, and
ingredient. For each test time and each room context,
children were credited with a 1 in each information category
they provided and a 0 for those they did not, thereby creating
proportion scores for each group. Tables 6 and 7 show the
proportion of children in each reminder group providing the 4
information categories in each context at the immediate and 2-
mo test, respectively.
Immediate Test
As seen in Table 6, in the reception room, about 30% of
the children provided the event goal, and an equivalent
proportion indicated their knowledge of the outcome. Fewer
children provided animals (21%) and ingredients (24%). In the
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Table 6
Proportion of Children in Each Group Providing
Information Categories in Each Context at the Immediate Test
Information Category
Receotion
Room:
Group
Goal Outcome Animal Inqredient
Action 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.09
Outcome 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.30
Reminiscence 0.46 0.27 0.27 0.18
No Reminder
Experimental
Room:
Group
0.40 0.40 • 0.10 0.40
Action 0.18 0.36 0.64 0.36
Outcome 0.40 0.60 0.70 0.50
Reminiscence 0.46 0.55 0.64 0.36
No Reminder 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.50
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Table 7
Proportion of Children in Each Group Providing
Information Categories in Each Context at the 2-Mo Test
Goal
Reception
Room:
Group
Action 0.09
Outcome 0.60
Reminiscence 0.64
No Reminder 0.10
Experimental
Room:
Group
Action 0.09
Outcome 0.60
Reminiscence 0.64
No Reminder 0.20
Information Category
Outcome Animal Ingredient
0.09 0.09 0.00
0.10 0.30 0.60
0.27 0.09 0.36
0.30 0.10 0.10
0.27 0.82 0.36
0.50 0.90 0.70
0.82 0.91 0.55
0.60 0.90 0.50
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experimental room, the percentages of children providing
animals (64%) and ingredients (43%) more than doubled.
Increases, though not as dramatic, were also seen for the
proportion of children reporting the goal (36%) and the
outcome (48%) in the experimental room context. Analyses of
variance and planned contrasts on these individual measures
indicated no group effects.
2-Mo Test
At the 2-mo test, as seen in Table 7, groups differed in
their reporting of 2 information categories in the reception
room — the goal and ingredients. The Action group had the
least number of children reporting that Teddy's goal was to
make silly soup; the Reminiscence group had the most children
reporting the goal. An analysis of variance indicated a
significant effect of group (F ( 3 , 38) =5 . 42 , p<.005). Both the
Outcome and Reminiscence groups differed significantly from
the No Reminder group (F (1 , 38) =7 . 03 , pc. 05 and F ( 1 , 38) =8 . 48
,
P<. 01, respectively); the Action group did not.
Again, children in the Action group provided the least
ingredient information (none) . An analysis of variance
indicated a significant effect of group (F (3 , 38) =4 . 93
,
pc. 005). The Outcome group was the only group to differ
significantly from the No Reminder group (F(l, 38) =8 . 13
,
pc. 01). About 20% of children overall provided the event
outcome and about 15% provided animals. There were no
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significant group differences revealed in the analysis of
variance or the planned separate contrasts.
In the experimental room, more children provided animals
(88%) and ingredients (53%) . Analyses of variance on these
measures indicated no significant effect of group nor did any
reminder group differ from the No Reminder group. Overall,
more children also provided the event outcome in the
experimental room. The Action group had the least number of
children who provided information about the spill while the
Reminiscence group had the most. An analysis of variance
indicated a marginal effect of group (F(3 , 38) =2 . 45, p<.10).
While no one of the three reminder groups differed from the No
Reminder group, the contrast between the Action group and the
other 3 groups combined was significant (F ( 1, 38) =4 . 76 , p<.05)
.
A similar pattern was seen with the reporting of the goal,
with least children in the Action group and most in the
Reminiscence group responding. The analysis of variance
indicated a significant group effect (F(3 , 38) =4 . 16, p<.05).
Both the Outcome and Reminiscence groups differed
significantly from the No Reminder group (F ( 1 , 38) =4 . 08 , p<.05
and F ( 1 , 38 ) =5 . 08 , p<.05, respectively); the Action group did
not.
Performance Over Time, Category,—and Context
An analysis of variance was carried out on these
proportions with 1 between- (group) and 3 within- (test time,
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room context, and information category) factors, to examine
performance over time, context, and category. Verbalization
performance by the children differed with treatment group,
(£(3,38) =3 . 00, p<. 05)
.
Overall, 81% of children verbalized at least one
information category at the immediate test in either context.
Although 93% of children did so at the 2-mo test, this
difference between test times was not significant.
More children provided information when more cues were
available in the experimental room (95%) than in the reception
room (76%) (F ( 1 , 38 ) =91 . 12 , pc.OOl). Production in the room
contexts was dependent upon both test and information
category, however. These interactions may be seen in Figures
4 and 5. Figure 4 displays production in both contexts at the
two test times (F ( 1 , 38) =8 . 91 , pc. 005). Interestingly, while
the proportion of children providing information in the
reception room decreased over time, the proportion of children
providing information in the experimental room increased.
Figure 5 shows the categories of information provided in
the two room contexts. As already mentioned, though more
children provided verbal information in the experimental room,
the increase differed somewhat for specific information
categories (F(3 , 114) =14 . 00, pc.OOl). Of particular interest
is the difference in reporting the goal and the outcome. The
proportion of children providing the event outcome in the
experimental room almost doubled relative to reception room
117
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reporting, while the proportion of children providing the
event goal was not significantly increased by the increase in
contextual support. Additionally, the increase in the
proportion of children providing animal names in the
experimental room was much greater than the increase in the
proportion providing ingredients.
Over all tests, contexts, and groups, more children
provided animals (95%) than ingredients (83%)
,
outcomes (71%)
,
and goals (52%)
,
although the analysis on the mean proportions
showed no significant category effect. (A chi-sguare test on
the pattern of responding did yield a significant effect of
category, however (X2 ( 3 ) =32 . 07 , <p<.001).)
Figure 6 shows the proportion of children in each group
reporting each category at each test. Of particular interest
is the finding that children in the Reminiscence group were
more likely to report information in every category at the
second test. For the other three groups, the proportion of
children providing information increased for some categories,
and decreased for others. This Group x Category x Test
interaction was marginally significant (F (9 , 114 ) =1 . 85 , p<.10).
Two additional analyses involving verbalizations at the
2-mo test were performed to characterize the differences
between the groups, and indicated poorer performance by the
Action group. First, the number of children reporting their
knowledge of the event goal either in the reception room or
the experimental room was compared. Only 1 child (<10-s) in
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the Action group provided the event goal while about 50% of
the children in the other 3 groups combined did so
(X (1)—5.35, . 01<p< .025) . Second, the number of children in
each group indicating knowledge of the event outcome either
verbally or behaviorally (by reenacting the spill) was
compared. Approximately 25% of the children in the Action
group indicated their knowledge of the outcome while almost
70% of the children in the 3 other groups combined did so
(X2 ( 1) =5 . 49 , . 01<p< .025)
.
Quality of Verbalization
It is apparent from the above analyses that the children
are capable of verbalizing components of the event. What is
not captured in the analyses, however, is the complexity and
timing of their utterances. Although most children provided
replies in one or two word sentences in response to directed
questions, some children were able to provide more elaborate
replies illustrating their memory for and knowledge of the
event. Below are just a few examples:
(1) During the first test trial when informed that the
giraffe brought soap, one child (RH) while still seated in his
chair looking at the giraffe said "I wanna go get it. It's
under the bath tub."
(2) One child (NB) after her reminder treatment with the
outcome stimuli told the experimenter during free play "I want
the silly soup Teddy to come back."
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(3) During the questioning period in the reception room,
one child (PH) after providing the goal and being asked what
was in the soup, replied "some funny things."
(4) The spill was of great interest for many of the
children. In the reception room, one child (SK) reported that
"Teddy spilled out the soup." Then in the experimental room,
he said "He wants to spill all the soup down" and then after
Teddy did so, the child told him "You clean it up." Another
child (AP) told the experimenter that "Teddy wants to dump
it."
Performance Compared to First Study Data
Separate contrasts were carried out on the proportion
of children verbalizing the four information categories in the
two contexts for each group in the present study against the
4-mo performance of the Same-Day Repetition group from the
first study. In the reception room, proportions of children
in both the Outcome and Reminiscence groups providing the
event goal were significantly greater than that of the earlier
group which had no children reporting (F (1 , 53) =17 . 38 , pc. 001
and F ( 1 , 53 ) =20 . 71 , p<.001, respectively). No significant
group effects were found for the proportion of children
providing the event outcome or animals in the reception room.
Both the Outcome and Reminiscence, groups also had a greater
proportion of children naming ingredients (F (1 , 53) =20 . 09
,
P< .001 and F ( 1 , 53 ) =7 . 82 , £<.01, respectively).
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In the experimental room, similar patterns were seen with
respect to the event goal. Proportions of children providing
it in both the Outcome and Reminiscence groups were
icantly greater than that of the earlier group
(E ( 1 / 53 ) =8 . 00 , pc. 01 and F ( 1 , 53 ) =9 . 82 , pc.OOl, respectively)
.
The pattern for the event outcome differed from that in the
reception room, however; the proportion of children reporting
it was significantly greater for the Reminiscence group than
the earlier group (F ( 1 , 53 ) =7 . 27 , pc.Ol). The proportions of
current groups reporting animals did not differ from that of
the earlier study. And finally, all groups but the Action
group had more children reporting ingredients in the
experimental room (Outcome : F (1, 53 ) =12 . 26 , pc.OOl,
Reminiscence : F(l,53)=7.45, pc.ol, and No Reminder :
F ( 1 , 53 ) =5 . 78 , pc. 05)
.
Range of Reminding Effects
A primary question of interest in this study concerns the
extent or range of reminding effects. That is, did the
reminder reactivate a general memory for the event or
reactivate only the specific aspect directly related to the
reminder itself? Of course, a related question is whether one
reminder was more successful in reactivating specific,
general, or both measures of memory. In order to attempt to
answer these questions, indices of specific and overall
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general memory were defined and computed and are discussed
below.
Specific Memory Index
Since the three reminders were not aimed at the same
specific event components, a proportion score was utilized to
compare the effectiveness of the reminders. For each
participant, a proportion score was computed to reflect how
much of the reminder-targeted component he or she recalled.
The target component of the Action group was successful
retrieval of the hidden ingredients. Since there were 6
trials, for participants in this group the proportion score
was determined by their number of successful retrievals
divided by 6. For the Outcome group, the targeted component
was indication of the spill. Children's proportions were
either 0 if they did not report or reenact the spill, or 1 if
they did indeed do so. The proportions for children in the
Reminiscence group were a little more difficult to determine
since children had different questions. For each question
children were asked (excluding "Who did you play with?") , they
received a 1 if they provided the correct target information
during their test and a 0 if they did not. This procedure was
modified slightly for the retrieval question. Children
received 0.17 for each successful retrieval. Thus, if
children were successful on all 6 trials, they received a 1.
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These scores for each question then were tallied and divided
by the total number of questions asked.
The mean proportions of reminder-targeted information
provided by each reminder group can be seen in Figure 7. it
is obvious that there was little variation among groups. The
Outcome group had the smallest mean proportion (.50) while the
Reminiscence group had the largest (.61). An analysis of
variance on these scores indicated no significant group
effect.
Overall Memory Index
As a general summarizing measure of the children's
overall memory, a memory index score was computed for each
participant, similar to the index used in previous long-term
assessments (Myers, Perris, & Speaker, 1994) . The score was
based on eight major dependent measures considered
independently above and could range from 0 to 10.
Participants received one point for each of the following
criteria:
1. First successful retrieval in less time than the mean
latency for all participants (M=34.01s).
2. More successful retrievals than the mean number of
retrievals for all participants (M=3.45).
3. Naming animals on more trials in the experimental room
than the mean number of trials for all participants (M=3.12).
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4. Naming ingredients on more trials in the experimental
room than the mean number of trials for all participants
(M=l. 14)
.
5. Naming animals in the reception room.
6. Naming ingredients in the reception room.
Participants also received one point for each of the following
if provided in the experimental room only, or 2 points if
provided in the reception room:
7. Providing the goal of the event (silly soup).
8. Providing the outcome of the event (the spill).
The distribution of mean overall memory index scores for
the groups can be seen in Figure 8. The analysis of variance
indicated a significant overall group effect (F (3 , 38) =4 . 36
,
P< . 01) . While both the Outcome and Reminiscence groups
differed significantly from the No Reminder group
(F ( 1 , 38 ) =5 . 37 , p< . 05 and F ( 1 , 38) =4 . 36 , p<.05, respectively),
the Action group did not.
Relation Between Specific and Overall Memory
Not surprisingly, children's specific memory proportions
and their overall memory scores were significantly correlated
(r=.49; t (30) =3 . 77 , p< .0005) . Correlations for each group
ranged from 0.42 to 0.77. The correlation was the largest for
the Action group and smallest for the Outcome group. A chi-
square test of independence indicated no group differences in
this pattern.
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Reminder Interaction and Specific and Overall Memory
Physical stimulus reminders . One issue of interest
if the reminders were facilitative only for those children who
physically interacted with or talked about them. To examine
this, children in the 3 physical stimulus groups ( Action .
Outcome , and No Reminder ^ were credited with a 1 in each
category (physical interactiveness and verbal interactiveness)
if they performed the behavior during the reminder treatment
and a 0 if they did not. A summary of the mean
interactiveness scores (and standard deviations) for the
groups can be seen in Table 8. Most children did not interact
in any manner with the reminder stimulus; physical contact was
made by about 20% of the children, and less than 3 0% made
comments. The Action group physically interacted with their
reminder the most, while the No Reminder group interacted the
least with their stimulus. With respect to verbal
interactiveness, the Outcome group talked the most about their
reminder, while the No Reminder group talked the least.
Analyses of variance carried out on these scores indicated no
significant group effects, however, and planned comparisons
also showed no significant differences. To determine the
relation of physical and verbal interactiveness, a correlation
between these scores was computed for children who interacted
in at least one of these ways. The correlation was not
significant (r=-0.43, p>.10).
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Table 8
Group Mean Reminder Interactiveness Scores
(and Standard Deviations)
Interactiveness Index
GrouD Phvsical Verbal
Action 0.27 0.36
(0.47) (0.51)
Outcome 0.20 0.40
(0.42) (0.52)
No Reminder 0.10 0.10
(0.32) (0.32)
Note : The No Reminder group was presented with a neutral
stimulus
.
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The physical and verbal interactiveness scores were each
then correlated with participants' specific memory and overall
memory indices and are reported in Table 9. An interesting
pattern of relations may be seen. For children in the Action
group, physical interactiveness with the reminder was
correlated with both specific and overall memory measures.
Verbal interactiveness, however, was only marginally
correlated with their overall memory. For children in the
Outcome group, physical interactiveness with the reminder was
correlated only with overall memory and not specific memory
proportions. Verbal interactiveness for the Outcome group was
only correlated (marginally) with their specific reminder-
targeted memory. Finally, for children in the No Reminder
group, neither physical nor verbal interactiveness was
correlated with overall memory.
Reminiscence reminder . As we could examine whether
touching and talking about a physical reminder facilitated
children's memory for event components, similarly for the
Reminiscence group we could ask if accompanying guestions with
photographs during reminiscing facilitated later recall during
test. For 5 components of the event (questions 2-6 of the
reminiscence script as shown previously in Table 2), 38
questions were posed to 11 participants, 18 with pictures and
20 without. During the memory test, children provided the
correct response for 50% of the picture-posed questions and
for 80% of the non-picture posed questions. A chi-square test
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Table 9
Correlations of Physical and Verbal Interactiveness Scores
with Measures of Specific and Overall Memory for Each Group
Correlations
Grouo
Physical/ Verbal/ Physical/ Verbal/
Specific Specific Overall Overall
Action _ _ _0.56 0.30 _ _ _ ***0.63 0 . 39 *
Outcome 0.00 0.41* 0 . 50** 0.26
No Reminder
*** p<.001* _ _
P< . 05
p< . 10
n/a n/a -0.42 0.07
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of independence indicated a marginally significant effect of
question type (picture-posed or not) (X2 (l)=3.66, .05<p<.l0).
To evaluate whether the effect might be due to children
talking more to the non-picture questions during the actual
reminiscing treatment, an analysis was carried out to see if
children talked more or less during reminiscing with pictures
or without. In general, children answered questions posed
with pictures 50%, and questions without pictures about 34% of
the time. A chi-square test of independence indicated no
difference in talking in the presence or absence of pictures.
Parents 1 Memory
During the reminder treatment, parents completed a
questionnaire. This questionnaire asked parents to report
their memory for the target event in response to five free
recall questions. A total of 40 parents completed the
questionnaire. Parents of two children did not complete it,
as they did not return for the second visit (one grandmother
and one babysitter came instead) . For 5 of the 9 memory
measures computed from these recall questions, parents were
given a 1 if they provided the information and a 0 if the did
not. These measures included providing the event goal, the
event outcome, the association of the bell and the arrival of
Teddy's friends, the need to rotate the turntable, and the
hidden "under" location of the ingredient. The remaining four
measures were the total number provided of each of the
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following: correct animals, correct ingredients, incorrect
animals, and incorrect ingredients. As can be seen in Table
10, the majority of parents remembered the event goal and
outcome, knew that the bell indicated the arrival of Teddy's
friend with the ingredient, and knew that to find the hidden
ingredient their child had to lift and look under the lid.
What the majority of parents failed to indicate was that the
turntable had to be rotated in order to successfully retrieve
the ingredient. Parents on average named about 1 correct
animal and 2 correct ingredients. Few incorrect animals were
provided and even fewer incorrect ingredients. Analyses of
variance on these measures with group as a factor indicated no
significant effect of group except for the number of correct
animals parents provided (F (3 , 36) =4 . 00
,
p<.05). Parents whose
children were assigned to the Action group reported fewer
correct animals than parents in the 3 other groups combined
(F ( 1 , 36) =8 . 93 , p< .01), and only the Action group differed
significantly from the No Reminder group (F ( 1, 36) =8 . 20
,
P<.01). No other group differences were noted.
As a general summarizing measure of parents' overall
memory, a memory index score was computed for each parent.
This score was based on seven components of the event and
could range from 0 to 7. Parents received one point for each
of the following criteria:
1. Providing the goal of the event (silly soup)
.
2. Providing the outcome of the event (the spill).
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Table 10
Group Means (and Standard Deviations) on Nine Measures
of Parents' Memory at the 2 -Mo Test
Group
Measure Action Outcome Reminiscence No Reminder
Goal 1 0.90
(0.32)
0.78
(0.44)
1.00
(0.00)
0.80
(0.42)
Bell 0.70 0.78 0.73 0.90
Association 1 (0.48) (0.44) (0.47) (0.32)
Turning
Table 1
0.00 0.22 0.18 0.20
(0.00) (0.44) (0.41) (0.42)
Lifting/ 0.90 0.78 0.55 0.60
Under 1 (0.32) (0.44) (0.52) (0.52)
Outcome 1 0.90
(0.32)
0.89
(.33)
1.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
Correct . 50 2.00 1.18 1.90
Animals2 (0.71) (1.12) (1.33) (1.10)
Incorrect 1.10 0.67 0.18 0.70
Animals2 (1.79) (0.87) (0.41) (0.82)
Correct 1.80 2 . 89 2 . 00 2.30
Ingredients 2 (1.32) (1.05) (1.41) (1.16)
Incorrect 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20
Ingredients2 (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.42)
Scored as 0-1 data.
2Scored as total number parent provided.
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3. Providing the association between the sound of the
bell and the arrival of Teddy's friends.
4. Indicating that their child had to rotate the
turntable in the search process.
5. Indicating that the hidden ingredient was under
something which had to be lifted.
6. Naming more event animals than the mean number named
for all parents (M=1.38).
7. Naming more event ingredients than the mean number
named for all parents (M=2.23).
The distribution of mean overall memory index scores for
the parents in each group can be seen in Figure 9. Although
the score for parents in the Action group was slightly lower
than the means for the other groups, the analysis of variance
indicated no significant group effect. Neither the planned
contrast between the three reminder groups combined and the No
Reminder group nor the separate contrasts were significant.
Relation between Children's and Parents' Memory
Children's and parents' memory have each been considered
separately above. To determine if relations between the two
existed, correlational analyses were carried out. Children's
and parents' overall memory scores for the target event were
not related (r=0.08).
The relation between children's and parents' memory is
not only of interest in terms of overall level of memory but
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also in terms of the errors that are made. Given the nature
of the target event, one area of error relates to misnaming
animals and ingredients. Of the 42 participants, 13 made
errors (3 each from the Action . Outcome . and Reminiscence
groups and 4 from the No Reminder group) while 13 parents also
made errors (2 from Action . 4 from Outcome . 2 from
Reminiscence
. and 5 from No Reminder ) . Of these parents and
children, there were only 5 parent-child dyads whose members
both made errors, and in these dyads none of the errors were
the same for parent and child.
Children's errors which occurred during the routine
proper were primarily on Trial 6. (Two of the children made
errors in the reception room as well. One named a dog and
fork and the other named milk and pop-tart.) Eleven children
erred on Trial 6 misnaming the fox a dog (4,) kangaroo (2),
tiger (2), brown bear (1), skunk (1), and wolf (1). Two
children erred on Trial 2 calling the racoon a kangaroo and
mouse, respectively, and 1 child erred on Trial 1 by naming a
sheep. No children misnamed ingredients.
Of the 13 parents making errors, all reported at least
one incorrect animal. Errors included the following animals:
dog (9), bird (5), squirrel (2), chicken (1), beaver (1) ,
alligator (1), skunk (1), rabbit (1), and zebra (1). Only 3
parents reported incorrect ingredients (lettuce, macaroni, and
nuts) . Prior knowledge and associations may have contributed
to parents' errors. It is interesting to note that all
but
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as an
one of the parents who named a bird reported an egg
ingredient. Also one parent who reported squirrel as an
animal listed nuts as an ingredient.
In addition to errors naming animals and ingredients, it
is possible to examine errors in knowledge of the retrieval
process. Fourteen children never retrieved an ingredient. Of
these children, 2 rotated the turntable and 4 indicated that
the ingredient was under something, in one way or another: Two
children lifted the animals and looked under them, 1 child
lifted the corresponding prop and looked under, and 1 said "Is
it under here?"
Parents of 13 of these children completed the question-
naire. Only 1 parent indicated knowledge that rotating the
turntable was a prerequisite for finding the hidden ingre-
dient. The child of this parent did not rotate the turntable.
Nine parents indicated the need to locate the ingredient under
something. For the 4 parents who did not, their children made
the same omission. In general, however, there seems little
evidence of any relation between the errors of children and
their parents.
Talk and Reenactment during the Retention Interval
In addition to providing data on their own memory,
parents were asked to report on the questionnaire if their
child had reenacted the event at home in any way, and if there
had been any discussion of the first visit. Parents of 16
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children reported that their child had discussed the event in
the intervening time; no children were reported to actually
participate in reenactment. Of the 16 children, 11 had self-
initiated conversation, 4 children had been prompted by
parents (even though asked not to do so at the end of the
first visit)
,
and 1 child was prompted by a sibling. Reports
indicated that 10 of the children apparently only discussed
the event once, while 6 discussed it multiple times.
Conversations of 9 of the children were reported to occur
either later on the same day as the first visit or close
thereto, often telling a parent or grandparent about the
event. Conversations of 6 children were reported to have
taken place either the day before or the day of the 2-mo test
visit, presumably in response to the parent mentioning the
impending visit to the University. One child who reportedly
discussed the event twice did so once on the day of the first
visit and once the day before the second visit.
Some parental reports indicated that the conversations
during the interval were vague and did not include many
details. Additionally, some parents did not fully provide
details on the questionnaire. Therefore, it is impossible to
accurately determine whether children repeated the information
of these conversations at the later time. However, even for
the few children who were reported to hold detailed
conversations about the event, and whose parents gave detailed
information about the contents, only some of the same target
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information was provided at the 2-mo test. No systematic or
consistent pattern of memory was evident.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Consonant with the findings of our first study with the
event, 2-year-old children in all groups in the current study
showed equivalent participation and enjoyment on an immediate
test. After a 2-mo interval, no group of children
demonstrated memory at the maximum level of performance, and
group differences were not apparent for all indices. Yet
reminder groups performed differently than the no reminder
group, each other, and the Same-Day Repetition group from the
first study, on a number of behavioral and verbal measures.
In this chapter, I will first quickly review the most salient
findings of the study and then interpret them in light of the
questions outlined in Chapter 3, and the current research
literature.
Salient Findings
In their trial by trial performance, the reminder groups
did not differ from the No Reminder group; they oriented to
the theater, searched for the hidden ingredient, retrieved the
ingredient, and named animals and ingredients equivalently.
It might appear reasonable to conclude therefore, that memory
of the event after 2 months was so sufficiently intact that
the reminder manipulation was ineffective. However,
comparison of performance with that of the group tested after
4 months in the earlier study was informative. If
all groups
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had performed better after 2 months than after 4, then it
might support the notion that less forgetting had occurred and
the reminders might be extraneous. Only two groups, the
Outcome and Reminiscence groups, performed better, however.
The Outcome group retrieved ingredients on significantly more
trials, the Reminiscence group named animals on more trials,
and both groups named ingredients on more trials, than the
earlier group. Thus, it is possible that further forgetting
from 2 to 4 months was negligible, and these specific
reminders influenced performance at the shorter delay.
Facilitative effects of reminder treatments for both the
Outcome and Reminiscence groups are even more evident when
considering their recall of the other event components. The
majority of children in both these groups indicated knowledge
of Teddy's goal of making silly soup. In fact, more children
in both the Outcome and Reminiscence groups provided the goal
in both contexts (reception and experimental rooms) . Children
in these groups also knew the spill outcome of the event.
Additionally, a greater proportion of children in the Outcome
group provided ingredients in the reception room.
The Outcome and Reminiscence groups also performed better
on some measures than the comparable group from the first
study. More children in both groups provided the event goal
in each context, and provided ingredients in the reception
room than the earlier group. Significantly more children in
the Reminiscence group provided the spill in the experimental
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room. Finally, more children in both groups provided
ingredients in the experimental room at their long-term test.
Thus, both the Outcome and Reminiscence groups appear to
be performing at a higher level than the other groups.
Indeed, both the Outcome and Reminiscence groups scored higher
on the overall memory index than the No Reminder group.
Furthermore, the Reminiscence group appears to have benefitted
from its reminder treatment in a manner that even the Outcome
group did not. More children in this group provided each of
the four event information categories at the 2-mo long-term
test than had done so at the immediate test! Apparently the
practice of structured talking about the event during the
reminder was beneficial to the children in a general way
beyond the specific information the reminder treatment
provided.
Overall, the Action group did not perform well. Indeed,
children in the Action group did not differ significantly from
the No Reminder group on the overall memory index. In
particular, children in this group provided the event goal and
outcome much less frequently than children in the other
groups. Only one child in the Action group provided Teddy's
goal of making silly soup, while only 3 children knew that
Teddy spilled the soup. This poor performance in verbalizing
event components was mirrored more generally as well in
comparisons to the earlier group. Quite simply, the Action
group did not differ from the earlier group on any measure.
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Hence, they were performing after a 2-mo interval in a manner
equivalent to that of children tested after 4 months. Taken
together, these results suggest that the Action reminder did
not benefit, and even may have interfered, with access to
memory representations.
Can 2-Year Olds Benefit From a Reminder?
Event repetitions have been shown by many researchers to
facilitate young children's memory of a number of different
experiences (e.g., Fivush & Hamond, 1989, Hudson & Sheffield,
under review, Myers et al., 1994). One issue addressed in
this study was how exposure to specific stimuli rather than
total event repetitions affects memory performance. The data
on group differences noted above, and also the absence of test
time effects, suggest that 2-year-old children's memories for
complex events can benefit from reminders. However, the
facilitation effects are not extremely strong. Surely,
nothing like maximum performance was seen for any of the
reminder groups, even when they differed from the no-reminder
control. The minimal facilitation pattern is consistent with
results of studies from other labs using different tasks and
reminding techniques, however (e.g. Sheffield & Hudson, 1994)
.
Why was performance of reminder groups so little
facilitated? Although the list is not exhaustive, I will
discuss four factors that I believe may potentially have had
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an impact on the pattern of performance and the demonstration
of reminder effects.
First, I want to suggest that playing with the farm after
the reminder treatment during the free play session may have
acted as a partial reenactment of the event and thus affected
all groups similarly. Hudson and Sheffield (under review)
found that reenactment of 4 of 8 activities 2 weeks after
training facilitated performance at a long-term test 8 weeks
later. They concluded that partial reenactment can reinstate
memory for an entire experience. Even though we questioned
the children only about Teddy's goal and outcome with silly
soup, it is possible that they included the farm play as part
of an integrated event comprising the entire University
experience. In other words, perhaps children encoded the
event as "I played with the farm, then went to Teddy's room to
make his soup; his friends brought things I found; Teddy
spilled the soup; I played with the farm again, then went back
to Teddy." If the farm play is indeed acting as a
reenactment, and since all children in all groups were engaged
with the farm, no large group differences should really be
expected, especially on behavioral indices during the trials
themselves. It does not explain why the facilitation overall
was small in magnitude, however.
A second factor pertains more directly to that issue.
Specifically, I believe that the immediate test/event
repetition administered to all children in order to ensure
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that the reminder groups did not differ at the onset, may have
constrained the facilitative effect of the reminders. As
reported previously, Hudson and Sheffield (under review) found
with 18-mo olds that reenactment on the same day was less
helpful than reenactment 2 or 8 weeks later and concluded that
the timing of a second encounter may be critical in
determining how long an event will be remembered up to 6
months. They suggested that event reorganization occurs at
reenactment and influences subsequent recall. We have seen,
too, that Walkenfeld and Nelson (1995, March) found that a
verbal reinstatement treatment 1 week after training in their
treasure hunt task facilitated 3-4-year olds' recall 2 weeks
later. They argue similarly to Hudson and Sheffield that
their children reorganized their recall within the framework
of the reinstatement interview. Finally, as reported earlier,
parallel effects were seen with our silly soup event. We
concluded from the first study that although children who
received an immediate test performed seemingly equivalently on
the first test to those with their first test at 2 weeks,
their performance may have been based on very different event
representations. Specifically, children in the immediate test
group may not have generated an abstracted representation of
the event organized as a game with a goal and outcome.
One could presume that since the groups in the current
study also received an immediate test, they would also fail to
generate an abstract representation of the event. If their
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event representations merely consisted of motor action
sequences and simple associations between particular visual
and verbal stimulus components, then it is possible that any
specific reminder may have been generally ineffective due to
the lack of connections between these units of knowledge
primed by the reminder, and the other unintegrated units in
the memory representation.
Unfortunately, constraints imposed by time and subject
availability forced me to select a single immediate event
repetition in the design of this study. Two important
questions for the future occur to me, however. First, would
reminders at the 2-mo test be more effective if an event
repetition occurred 2 weeks later rather than on the same day?
If we are right that event repetition at 2 weeks fosters a
more abstract reorganization of the event representation and
that this type of representation is required for effective
reminding, then the answer should be yes. To the second
question, the answer is less obvious. Would the reminders be
effective without any preceding event repetition? If a single
experience without repetition still allows children to encode
traces of the event that are not completely forgotten after 2
months, and if these event components are organized as simple
associations, similar to those hypothesized for an immediate
repetition experience, and if the reminders themselves permit
event representations to be reorganized more abstractly at
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their presentation, then facilitation might be seen. Failing
any of these conditions, reminder effects are unlikely.
A third factor potentially affecting the effectiveness of
the reminder treatment in the current study is the timing of
the reminder. Perris et al. (1990) tested 2.5-year olds after
a 2-year interval and found a facilitative effect of a
reminder given 30 min before test. Ryder, Sheffield, and
Hudson (1995, March) found a video reminder 15-min before test
to be helpful to 18-mo olds after a 10 week delay. On the
other hand, Boiler et al. (1990) found that a 30-minute
reminder before test with 6-mo-old infants in the mobile
conjugate paradigm was not effective. According to Rovee-
Collier, Greco-Vigorito, and Hayne (1993)
,
the most effective
reminders are presented after a significant delay, just prior
to the onset of forgetting. Hayne and Rovee-Collier (1995)
also stress the need to know the status of memory at the time
of test in order to effectively remind children. Given the
volume of studies Rovee-Collier and her colleagues have
conducted using the mobile-conjugate paradigm, they have been
able to chart the forgetting curve quite exactly. This is not
the case at this time for the Silly Soup event, and it is
certainly possible that neither the delay interval (2 mos) nor
the reminder interval (30 min before test) were optimal. As
more studies are undertaken, a more complete picture of the
parameters of remembering, forgetting, and reminding for the
event should be forthcoming.
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The fourth factor possibly contributing to the limited
effectiveness of reminders here pertains to the context in
which the reminders were introduced. Specifically, it is
possible that the reminders were less effective because they
were presented not in the experimental room, but in the
reception room. As we have noted above, Rovee-Collier and her
colleagues have explored the role of context in early memory
extensively. Rovee-Collier and Hayne (1987) concluded that
specific details of proximal cues, those closely associated
with a learned contingency, are forgotten first, before
general features, and distal cues, such as the context. They
predict that if proximal cues are forgotten and the reminding
or testing context does not match the represented context,
then retrieval will not be as successful. Hayne and Rovee-
Collier (1995) found that the presence of distinctive context
cues during training and reminding facilitated retrieval of
specific details of the event. In the current study then, it
is possible that children did indeed forget the specific cues,
and thus distal cues of the experimental context would become
important to reactivate their memory. Certainly in general,
more memory was evidenced in the experimental room context.
The reminder treatments were not administered in the
experimental context, however. On these grounds too, it may
not be surprising that they did not prove to be very effective
in cuing retrieval.
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The effects of context change are not always consistent,
however. Rovee-Collier has shown clearly in the mobile
conjugate reinforcement task that changes in context may
interfere with infant memory. Hanna and Meltzoff (1993), on
the other hand, have reported that changes in context (from
lab to home and day care to home settings) do not affect
memory retrieval of toddlers in a deferred imitation task.
Additionally, Bauer and Dow (1994) have shown that changes in
the props provided for imitation also have no effect on
recall. In sum, effects of context undoubtedly depend on the
age of the participants, delay intervals, and tasks.
Are Certain Reminders More Facilitative Than Others?
In addition to asking generally whether 2-year olds could
benefit from reminders, we were interested here in whether
certain types of reminders were more effective than others and
why. Specifically, we evaluated the effects of providing
physical stimuli related to either a salient action in the
event, or the outcome, and of reminiscing with the child about
components of the event with or without picture stimuli. As
Rovee-Collier (1990) noted, not all components of training are
functionally equal in cuing retrieval and that was the case in
the current study. While the answers are already somewhat
apparent from the preceding discussion, in this section I will
consider the specific reminder effects in more detail, along
with potential reasons for their differential effectiveness.
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The Action reminder. As reviewed above, previous
research reveals that young children tend to remember
primarily the motor activity of events, especially when they
perform it (e.g., Jones, Swift, & Johnson, 1988), and shows
that providing an action context at the time of test
facilitates recall in 5-year-old children (e.g., Smith,
Ratner
,
& Hobart, 1987). We predicted perhaps even greater
facilitation of an action reminder for our younger children.
Additionally, as discussed previously, even if the experience
of the immediate test may not have allowed for the development
of an abstract event representation, we assumed that children
at least had a representation of the event composed of
associations and motor action sequences. At the very least,
the Action reminder was predicted to facilitate retrieval of
these basic associative links.
This was not the case, however. The Action group overall
fared no better than the No Reminder group. One might argue
that the effectiveness of a reminder treatment should not be
assessed by overall event memory, but rather should be judged
by memory for the reminder-targeted component of the event.
In the case of the Action group, successful retrieval of the
concealed ingredients was defined as the most appropriate
index of reminder-targeted event memory. Yet the Action, group
not only did not exceed performance of the other current study
groups, but did not differ from the earlier study group tested
after 4 months.
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Two issues need to be considered in evaluating why the
Action reminder was not as facilitative as expected. First,
the presentation of the isolated empty turntable may have
introduced a rather extreme change in context for the Action
reminder group. During the training event, the turntable was
placed on the ledge of the puppet theater. Both the turntable
and the ledge were covered in the same green felt. It is
possible that children merely encoded the turntable as part of
the theater. When the turntable was presented alone on a bare
wood table in the reception room, therefore, the children may
not have recognized it as a component of the event. As Rovee-
Collier has stated many times, an effective reminder must be
highly specific to what was originally encoded. The reminder
may then not have matched that encoded and therefore could not
facilitate memory.
Another potential deficiency of the Action reminder as
operationalized here was the absence of any additional
organizational information, such as the event goal or outcome.
Since it is possible that children's representation of the
event comprised action sequences and simple associations
between stimuli as argued above, rather than an abstracted
understanding, and since the Action reminder did not provide
any hierarchical organizing information with which children
could modify their event representation at the moment, it is
possible that the reminder was ineffective due to lack of
connections to higher level organization of knowledge. It
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should be remembered that children in the Action group were
very unsuccessful in providing the event goal or outcome
either verbally or behaviorally
. Children in this group
obviously had very little access to these components. As
previously noted, Bauer, Hertsgaard, and Wewerka (1995) gave
15-mo olds either enabling or arbitrary events to imitate, and
provided reminders at the time of test. They found that
reminders facilitated recall of enabling sequences but not
arbitrary ones. They hypothesize that events containing
enabling relations are represented in a more organized
fashion. One could extend this argument to suggest that
providing information in the reminder itself might allow more
organized event representation, which would then facilitate
recall. For the Action reminder group this potential benefit
was unavailable.
The Outcome reminder . While the research literature
indicated that young children may be aided by the presence of
actions, outcomes have often been found to be less helpful for
this age group (e.g., Ratner and Foley, 1994). Consequently,
we predicted that providing an outcome reminder might do very
little to enhance memory recall in our 2-year olds. However,
this negative prediction was tempered by two arguments.
First, it is possible that facilitative effects of outcomes
were not previously found with young children because of the
mode of test. Young children may not always be able to
verbalize their knowledge of the outcome, but could
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behaviorally indicate their knowledge. Second, it is possible
that the outcomes were not salient for young children in prior
studies. Since our procedure utilized multiple measures and
the event outcome was found to be salient to 2-year-old
children in the earlier study, we surmised that the Outcome
reminder might in fact facilitate memory here.
Indeed, this was the case. Our 2-year-old children were
able to benefit from outcome information presented to them 30
min before test. Children in this group provided the event
goal and outcome, named ingredients in the reception and
experimental rooms and retrieved hidden ingredients more than
comparison groups, and their overall memory scores were
significantly higher than those of the No Reminder group.
Thus, contrary to Ratner and Foley's (1994) results indicating
little influence of outcomes on the recall of toddlers and
preschoolers, children were able to make use of the goal-
related nature of the outcome. Presentation of this
information at the time of test is apparently sufficient to
either spark associations which may already be present, or to
allow the child to modify his or her event representation to
a more abstracted understanding.
The Reminiscence reminder . As discussed previously, much
of the work exploring reminiscing has methodological problems,
and a goal of the current study was to investigate the effects
of reminiscences in a much more standardized way.
Reminiscence was predicted to be an effective reminder at
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least in terms of verbal recall, given the results from prior
studies (e.g., Hudson, 1993). Effects on behavioral indices
of memory were unsure since reminiscence studies have not
included them. Neither have they included pictures of event
components, but reminiscence with pictures in the current
study might be expected to facilitate memory simply on the
grounds of more general cognitive research showing that young
children can use pictured information (e.g., DeLoache, 1989).
The Reminiscence group did benefit from their reminder
treatment. As predicted, children in this group were more
able to verbalize event components at the 2-mo test. The
increased proportions of children in the Reminiscence group
verbalizing each of the four information categories at the 2-
mo test is consistent with the results from Walkenfeld and
Nelson (1995, March). They found that their verbal
reinstatement manipulation facilitated preschoolers ' long-term
event recall.
Not only did children in the Reminiscence group benefit
in terms of the pattern of their verbalizations, children in
this group provided the event goal and outcome, named animals
on trials, and named ingredients in the reception and
experimental rooms more than comparison groups, and their
overall memory scores were significantly higher than those of
the No Reminder group. Thus, it appears that reminiscence
benefits more than verbal performance.
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In addition to asking the general question about whether
reminiscence is effective, a question of interest here is
whether reminiscence conducted with pictures is more
facilitative than reminiscence without pictures. The analysis
of the reminiscence conversations themselves revealed that the
amount of talk was the same in both cases. Surprisingly,
however, during the test children provided more information
about event components which they had discussed without
pictures during reminiscence. One possible explanation might
be that the pictures merely sparked simple verbal associations
during reminiscence, yet these associations were sufficient
for replying to the questions. Reminiscence questions
unaccompanied by pictures might require some interpretation
and possibly even abstraction of the component before a reply
could be forthcoming, however. Thus, questions without
pictures may be more facilitative because they encourage
further event organization. This explanation may be seen as
analogous to that offered for the Same-Day and 2-week
repetition effect in the first study. The groups performed
seemingly equivalently on their first test, but differences
apparent at the second test reflected representational
differences.
Specific and General Memory Reactivation
A third question of primary interest in this study was
the extent or range of reminding effects. Did the reminders
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reactivate a general memory for the event or reactivate only
the specific aspects directly related to the reminders
themselves? As we have seen in the analysis of pertinent
reminder-targeted memory, the reminders were approximately
equally effective in eliciting their own event components.
Performance on the overall memory index was considered an
index of reminder ability to reactivate general memory. In
this case, the reminder treatments clearly differed. Only the
Outcome and Reminiscence reminders appear to have reactivated
a general memory for the event. For example, the Outcome
reminder not only helped children recall the event outcome but
also helped them to remember ingredients, the goal, and
possibly even how to retrieve ingredients. Additionally,
children in the Reminiscence group were able to provide event
component information even for components which they did not
discuss during their reminiscing treatment.
These results suggest that the effects of the reminder
were not just local ones, but rather more global. Hudson and
Sheffield (under review) using an elicited imitation paradigm
have data that are consistent. As previously discussed, they
found that partial reenactment of event activities was helpful
in recalling all of the activities, even those not reenacted.
Both sets of results are consistent with Sheffield and
Hudson's (1994) proposal that children encode and store
memories in an associative network. In the current study,
presentation of particular event components appear to spark
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memory for the whole event. However, Howe, Courage and
Bryant-Brown (1993) found no facilitative overall effect of a
partial reminder in a hidden object task with 3-1/2-year olds.
The discrepancy in results may very well reflect
differences in the type of task. The hidden object task
probably is one in which particular paired associations
between location cues and hidden objects are of overriding
importance, and knowing one should not necessarily impact on
knowing another. In the Hudson and Sheffield tasks and our
task, on the other hand, the component associations might very
well be connected to general goals of the play session. The
Hudson and Sheffield tasks might easily be represented in
relation to each other as different kinds of activities in an
overall play event. In the Silly Soup event, it is even more
apparent that the event goal, outcome, and trial activities
are connected.
Level of Reminder Involvement
An issue related to the range of reminding effects is
what the range of behaviors induced by the reminder can tell
us about any memory mechanisms involved in retrieval of
information during the memory test. Both verbal and physical
interactiveness with the reminder stimuli were examined in
relation to specific and overall memory. As we have seen,
little interaction of either type took place. Nonetheless,
the type of interactiveness and the nature of the reminder-
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targeted memory were related. Even though the Action reminder
was in general ineffective, physical interactiveness for the
children in this group was correlated with specific memory,
that is, retrieval of the ingredient, a physical action. This
is exactly what would be predicted if reenacting the turntable
action sparked procedural memory for that action in the
experimental room. On the other hand, physical interactive-
ness was positively correlated with overall event memory for
this group as well. Since the overall memory index included
verbal measures as well, it seems reasonable to suggest that
more than procedural memory may have been at work.
For the Outcome reminder group, verbal interactiveness
was correlated with specific memory, that is providing the
spill information. However, only physical interactiveness was
positively correlated with the overall event memory index for
this group. Again, this argues for the possibility of
associative processes working both ways, that is, between
procedural and verbal connections.
Child and Parent Memory
As far as we know, no prior studies have examined both
children's and parents' memory for a child-oriented event,
although surely the literature is rampant with examples of how
adults remember more than children. Not surprisingly then,
although children and parents both demonstrated memory for
this event, children's overall memory scores were
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proportionally lower. Parents' memory was far from perfect,
however. They were able to recall the gist of the event, but
many made errors on details of animals and ingredients.
No correlation was found between children's overall
memory for the event and their parents' overall memory. This
may not necessarily be unexpected since parents were asked not
to discuss the event with their children. But it is an
interesting finding on two grounds. First, although parents
were asked not to discuss the event with their children, some
reported doing so, and indicated that their children, as well
as themselves, provided information in the conversations.
However, as noted earlier, there was no systematic pattern in
whether this information was recalled at the test time.
Although different information was recalled during parental
conversations and at test, the information was accurate each
time. This inconsistency in children's recall over time has
been found by other researchers (e.g. ; Fivush 1994, Fivush &
Hamond, 1989) . In addition, in the current study, children
did not incorporate information originally provided by their
parent in their later recall, and this pattern was also found
by Fivush (1994) . Thus, despite some talk between parents and
children about the event, no relation between their memories
was evident here.
Second, the lack of correlation between children's and
parents' memories leads us to question the argument that
children's memory is strongly affected by parental structuring
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and influence. Tessler and Nelson (1994) propose that the
child's verbalized memory for experience is very much affected
in both form and content by the way the event is talked about
during, as well as after, the experience. At least in these
circumstances, where discussion of the event was discouraged,
this does not seem to be the case. Furthermore, parents'
memory of the event was less than complete and contained
inaccuracies, and yet these too were not reflected in their
children's memory.
Some Concluding Remarks
This data set, in addition to those of prior studies,
emphasizes the need for multiple measures of what is encoded
and remembered about complex events. For example, had only
behavioral measures involved in reenactment been used,
children's knowledge of the event goal would have gone
unnoticed. The variable patterns of verbal and physical
behavior further support the value of obtaining as complete an
assessment of memory as possible.
It is also important to re-emphasize that performance on
a task such as this depends on many factors other than just
memory, and because of this, evidence of memory failure may
not necessarily be that. These other factors include
momentary interest, motivation to comply, temperament, social
skills, language skills, and even interpretation of task
demands. One example of this last point may be illustrated
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from the current study. The experimenter accompanied the
child to the puppet theater during both training and the
immediate test. Since she did not move from her seat at the
2-mo test, and children were not told that they could approach
the theater to search unless they specifically asked, it is
possible that some children thought that they were not allowed
to do so. Perhaps if children had been informed directly that
they could approach the theater on their own, we might have
seen more behavioral evidence of search and retrieval at the
2
-mo test.
Additionally, just because some children performed poorly
at the 2-mo test, it does not necessarily mean that their
memory for the event was gone. It is interesting to speculate
about how the children in this study might perform on a
similar memory test in the future. Perhaps despite the
differences in the efficacy of the reminders, the reenactment
of some or most of the event components will permit better
performance for participants in all groups in the months or
years ahead. Alternatively, perhaps only children given the
Outcome and Reminiscence reminders, which seemed to stimulate
more organized abstract representations, will show facilitated
recall at a later time.
Finally, the findings of the current study have advanced
our understanding of early memory in at least the following
two ways. First, previous studies have shown facilitative
effects on memory for simple sequences or unrelated activities
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of reminders presented in the experimental context of the
tasks. Here we have demonstrated that memory of a much more
complex integrated event may be facilitated by specific
reminders of one or more event components presented in a
context more removed from the event. Second, we have argued
from the findings of the first study with this complex event
that the timing of an event repetition facilitates memory to
the degree to which abstracted understanding underlies recall.
The current findings permit us to expand that argument. Even
when an immediate event repetition does not itself foster a
more abstract event representation, presentation of organizing
event components such as goal and outcome during the reminder
treatment will either spark associative links allowing recall,
or allow for modification of the representation to include
these components. Thus, we suggest that reminder stimuli may
facilitate memory to the degree to which they themselves
provide abstract organizing information about a complex event.
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APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM FOR SESSION 1
Consent Form for Participants in Study of Early Memory #8
Principal Investigators: Cindy J. Speaker and Nancy A. Myers
In our current study, 2-year-old children and their parents
will be involved in a pretend play session with our teddy bear
and will return 2 months later to play again. The activity
involves making teddy's favorite meal during which time there
will be a pleasant scent present. You may observe throughout
the sessions, which last about 25 minutes. We ask only that
you remain facing forward watching your child during the
session. The session will be recorded on videotape, and these
tapes will be scored for indices of memory.
There is no danger or discomfort to your child and you may
stop the session at any time. There are no direct benefits to
your child; however, the results of this study will increase
our knowledge of early memory. All records are kept
confidential and, in analyzing data,- children are identified
by number rather than name. Participation in this research is
voluntary and there is no penalty of any sort for not
participating. This project has been reviewed and approved by
the Psychology Department Human Subjects Committee.
Now that you have read the description above, please ask us
any further questions that occur to you about any aspect of
the procedure, and when we answer them to your satisfaction,
please sign the following statement:
"I have been informed of the procedures of this study, have
had questions answered to my satisfaction, and believe I
understand the experiment. I am further aware that my child
is free to stop and that I am free to withdraw my permission
at any subsequent time without prejudice to me or my child."
Parent ' s S ignature Date
Child's Full Name Date of Birth
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APPENDIX B
CONSENT FORM FOR SESSION 2
Consent Form for Participants in Study of Early Memory #8
2-Month Visit
Principal Investigators: Cindy J. Speaker and Nancy A. Myers
In this 2-month visit of our current study, 2-year-old
children and their parents will be involved again in a pretend
play session with our teddy bear. Prior to playing with
Teddy, your child will receive a brief reminder of the earlier
event and be asked a series of questions 20-25 minutes later.
Since our particular interest is in your child's spontaneous,
unassisted expression of memory, we ask that you do not answer
any of our questions yourself, or probe your child for
answers. Your job is to provide support and comfort. During
the time playing with Teddy, we want to remind you that it is
important to sit back in your chair watching your child, so as
to not block our videocamera's view and again, please do not
answer any questions directly. The session will be recorded
on videotape, and these tapes will be scored for indices of
memory
.
As before, there is no danger or discomfort to your child and
you may stop the session at any time. There are no direct
benefits to your child; however, the results of this study
will increase our knowledge of early memory. All records are
kept confidential and, in analyzing data, children are
identified by number rather than name. Participation in this
research is voluntary and there is no penalty of any sort for
not participating. This project has been reviewed and
approved by the Psychology Department Human Subjects
Committee
.
Now that you have read the description above, please ask us
any further questions that occur to you about any aspect of
the procedure, and when we answer them to your satisfaction,
please sign the following statement:
"I have been informed of the procedures of this study, have
had questions answered to my satisfaction, and believe I
understand the experiment. I am further aware that my child
is free to stop and that I am free to withdraw my permission
at any subsequent time without prejudice to me or my child.
Parent ' s S ignature Date
Child's Full Name Date of Birth
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APPENDIX C
PARENT QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR OFFICE USE
ONLY:
S # M F
P M F
1.
Were you present at the first University session 2 months
ago? YES NO
2.
Were any other family members present at the previous
session? YES NO
If yes, please indicate relation to child (i.e., father,
brother, sister) and ages of any siblings present.
3
.
Has your child in any way recreated or played the event?
YES NO
If yes, please note how and when.
4.
Have you discussed the event with your child? YES NO
If yes, please estimate the number of such occasions and as
much detail of the conversations as possible. Also please
note if your child has discussed the event with anyone else
(such as a sibling, grandparent, etc.).
Please turn the page over and continue.
Although this study is focused on children's memory, we are
curious as to what parents might remember by just observingtheir child in the event. Please answer the followinqquestions as fully as you can.
5.
What does Teddy our bear like to do?
6.
What friends of Teddy come to visit, and how do you know
when they ' re coming?7.
What items do Teddy's friends bring?
8.
How did your child find what they brought?
9
.
How or why does the event end?
APPENDIX D
REMINDER TREATMENT SCORING SHEET FOR SESSION 2
EM #8 REMINDER TREATMENT SCORING SHEET
Date
Subject Information:
Name # Group
Complete the following:
1.
Behavior List what the child does during the 3-min
interval including what s/he plays with or touches, who s/he
talks to, etc.
2. Physical Interactiveness—Rate the child's physical inter-
activeness with the stimuli on a scale from 1 to 5 where l=No
contact at all and 5=Almost continuous contact. (Physical
inter-activeness is defined as any physical contact with the
stimuli including touching, hugging, turning, etc.)
Rating:
3. Interest—Rate the child's interest in the stimuli on a
scale from 1 to 5 where l=No interest at all and 5=Almost
continuous interest. (Interest includes looking at, talking
about, etc. as well as physical contact.)
Rating :
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APPENDIX E
OUTLINE OF SCORING PACKET
Subject #
Session #
Scorer #
I. Open-ended Responding
A. In Reception Room ("What do you think we'll do today?")
1. Provides General Procedure/Host ("play with Teddy")
2. Provides Specific Procedure ("friends bring stuff for
soup")
3. Provides Goal Activity ("make soup")
4. Names Animals
a. Event animals
b. Nonevent animals
5. Names Items
a. Event items
b. Nonevent items
6. Indices of outcome ("spills soup," "spills," "made a
mess," or "let's not spill")
7 . Other
B. In Experimental Room ("What does Teddy want to do?")
1. Verbal Reporting
a. Goal Activity ("make soup")
b. Refers to Outcome ("spilling")
c. Comments on Olfactory Cue Before Experimenter
("smells good")
2 . Behavioral Indices
a. Stirs before Experimenter elicits
b. Sniffs before Experimenter elicits
3 . Other
II. Routine Proper — Trial #
A. Does child orient to the theater?
If yes, record when (after bell but before "What's
that?", after question, after animal named by E, etc.):
Other comments of verbalizations or behaviors of child:
B. Does child name an animal?
If yes, record what animal (s) and when named (before
animal in view, after animal in view after named by E,
etc. )
:
Other comments of verbalizations or behaviors of child:
C. Does child approach the theater?
If yes, answer the following questions and make any
comments concerning the behavior:
1. Did the child show general search behavior? If so, how
much and in what ways?
2. Did the child turn the turntable? If so, how far
(halfway, complete, etc.)?
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3. Did the child lift the lid and retrieve the item?
4. Did the child provide any verbal report of "under"?
5. Other comments of verbalizations or behaviors of child:
D. Does child name an item?
If yes, record what item(s) and when named (after "What
did he bring?," after finding it, after named by E,
etc. )
:
Other comments of verbalizations or behaviors of child
(include here subsequent verbalizations and
behaviors which occur before the next trial begins)
:
E. Concluding Episode
1. Behavioral Indices
a. Enacts "Teddy smells the soup"
b. Enacts "Teddy spills the soup"
c. Provides anticipatory prevention of spill
d. Other
2. Verbal Indices
a. Reports Teddy wishes to smell the soup
b. Reports Teddy will spill the soup or indicates wish
to prevent spill (e.g., "Don’t let him spill")
c. Other
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